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ABSTRACT
Algebraic Side-Channel Attack (ASCA) is a side-channel attack that models the cryp-
tographic algorithm and side-channel leakage from a system as a set of equations, then
solves for the secret key. Unlike pure side-channel attacks, ASCA has low data com-
plexity and can succeed in unknown plaintext/ciphertext scenarios. However, past
research on ASCA has been done on either 8-bit microcontroller data or simulated
data. In this dissertation, we explore the application and feasibility of error tolerant
ASCA on a field-programmable gate array (FPGA). FPGAs run faster and are more
difficult for the encryption power trace to be isolated, so it presents more of a chal-
lenge for the attacker. Our work is the first to show that FPGAs are as susceptible
to ASCA as 8-bit micro-controllers. As a result, the attack could have widespread
implications since it may be applicable to other hardware platforms as well.
While algebraic side-channel attack (ASCA) has been successful in breaking sim-
ple cryptographic algorithms, it has never been done on larger or more complex algo-
rithms such as Twofish. Compared to other algorithms that ASCA has been used on,
Twofish is more difficult to attack due to the key-dependent S-boxes as well as the
complex key scheduling. In this dissertation, we demonstrate the first algebraic side-
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channel attack on Twofish, and examine the importance of side-channel information
in getting past the key-dependent S-boxes and the complex key scheduling.
While ASCA is feasible on a variety of platforms, it is susceptible to error and the
complexity of the model may drastically increase the runtime as well as the memory
consumption. In this dissertation, we explore the attack by examining the importance
of various Hamming weights in terms of success of the attack, which also allows us to
gain insights into possible areas of focus for countermeasures, as well as successfully
launch ASCA on AES with a larger error tolerance.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Modern security systems depend heavily on the use of cryptography. Cryptography
usually refers to methods that transform messages, or plaintexts, into unintelligible
texts, or ciphertexts. In general, three techniques are commonly used: hash functions,
public key cryptography and symmetric key cryptography.
• Hash functions, or message digests, use a mathematical transformation to
compute a fixed-length hash value from the plaintext that makes it impossible
for the contents of the plaintext to be recovered (example, MD5 or SHA-3). No
key is used in this algorithm and it is primarily used for message integrity or
passwords.
• Public key cryptography, or asymmetric encryption, uses a public key for
encryption and a private key for decryption (example, RSA or Diffie-Hellman).
The public key may be freely distributed to anyone that wishes to send a secure
encrypted message, while its paired private key remains a secret to only those
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authorized to decrypt or view the original message. The private key cannot
be derived from the public key. It is primarily used for authentication, non-
repudiation, and key exchange.
• Symmetric key cryptography is where a single key is used to both encrypt
and decrypt the message (example, AES or Blowfish). It is primarily used for
privacy and confidentiality. Unlike public key cryptography, which typically acts
on very large numbers, symmetric ciphers involve a large number of very simple
key-dependent operations being repeated many times. Thus, it is often used for
bulk data transmission. Symmetric key cryptography is generally categorized
as stream ciphers or block ciphers. Stream ciphers operate on one byte or
word of the message at a time while block ciphers partitions the message into
blocks, usually of 64-bit or 128-bit size, then operate on one block at a time.
Stream ciphers are faster and have lower error propagation. However, it has
low diffusion and is susceptible to insertion or modification. Block ciphers have
high diffusion and immunity to tampering.
This dissertation focuses on exploiting the security vulnerabilities of symmetric block
ciphers. The security and strength of cryptographic algorithms are typically ana-
lyzed assuming a faithful implementation and that no information leaks from that
implementation. A mathematically secure cryptographic algorithm should contain
two properties: confusion and diffusion.
• Confusion obscures the connection between the key and ciphertext so that it
is difficult to find the key even if one has a large number of plaintext/ciphertext
pairs produced with the same key. It generally increases vagueness by substi-
tution algorithms.
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• Diffusion is used to increase the redundancy of the plaintext over as many
parts of the ciphertext as possible. Any patterns that exist are scrambled and
scattered, which makes it more difficult to spot and vastly increases the amount
of data to analyze to break the cipher.
Most symmetric block ciphers contain an input whitening that combines the plaintext
with the key, the results go through operations for diffusion and confusion repeated
multiple times or multiple rounds to output the ciphertext. While the algorithm
and its implementation are public, the key is kept secret. With good confusio n
and diffusion in the algorithm, the ciphertext will then be meaningless to anyone
except those who know the secret key. The cryptographic algorithm is considered
to be computationally secure if there is no attack known that can break it within a
reasonable amount of time and with a reasonable amount of computing power. The
algorithm is broken if an attacker is able to retrieve the plaintext or even worse,
acquire the secret key. Thus, the security of the algorithm depends on the length and
storage of the key as well as the design of the algorithm itself. Many algorithms are
designed so that the effort of breaking them grows exponentially when the length of
the key increases. The key should also be stored in a secure location that can only
be accessed by authorized users.
However, a correct implementation of a strong algorithm may still be vulnerable to
many attacks due to information leakage from the implementation. One type of such
attack is called Side-channel analysis (SCA). SCA is based on the idea that seemingly
harmless leakage from the cryptosystem, such as power consumption or electromag-
netic waves, can be exploited to break the cryptographic algorithm. The attack is
passive and non-invasive, which means the device does not need to be tampered with
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so it can be very difficult to detect. Since the required equipment for SCA attacks are
readily available and they are relatively easy to implement, protection against SCA
is a major concern for most simple devices that may fall into the physical possession
of an adversary such as smart cards.
1.1 Power Analysis Attacks
One popular type of SCA is the power analysis attack, which exploits the fact that
there is a correlation between the power consumption of the device and the data it
processes or the operations it performs. Most smart card processors are implemented
with CMOS circuits. The static power consumption of CMOS circuits is typically
very low and the dynamic power consumption is typically the dominant factor in
the total power consumption. Dynamic power consumption occurs if an internal or
output signal of a logic cell switches and it also depends on the data processed by the
circuit. Since the input to the cryptographic algorithms consists of plaintext and a
secret key, there is a correlation between the secret key and the power consumption
leakage of any intermediate values processed during encryption. With enough data
collected, the attacker is able to acquire the secret key with statistical analysis using
a divide-and-conquer strategy.
The power analysis attack was first proposed in 1999 and successfully performed
on DES [21]. Since then, it has also been proven to be successful on all common
modes (ECB, CBC, CFB, OFB and CTR) of AES [19] as well as XTS-AES, an
advanced mode of AES for data protection of sector-based devices that features two
secret keys and an additional tweak for each data block [26]. The most basic power
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analysis attack is called Simple Power Analysis (SPA). It directly interprets the power
trace of a device as it performs an operation and maps the operation types with the
corresponding consumption pattern. Because the trace can reveal the sequence of
instructions executed, it can be used to break cryptographic implementations in which
the execution path depends on the data being processed such as DES key scheduling or
permutation. However, most implementations of symmetric cryptographic algorithms
have sufficiently small power consumption variations that SPA does not yield key data
[21].
Figure 1.1: Hamming distance and power consumption for a basic XOR operation
implemented on a 8-bit microcontroller.
The more popular and commonly used power analysis attacks are Differential
Power Analysis (DPA) and Correlation Power Analysis (CPA). They examines the
correlation between the power trace and data it processes using statistical analysis.
The switching of the gates in the circuit causes a current flow that is observable. The
Hamming weight model, which counts the number of switches, is often used to model
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the relationship between the power trace and the intermediate variables which are
correlated with the secret key. The Hamming weight model assumes that all cells
contribute to the power consumption equally and that there is no difference between
0→ 1 and 1→ 0 transitions. Figure 1.1 from [5] shows the observable differences in
power consumption and the corresponding Hamming distance, which is an extension
of the Hamming weight model and uses changes in logic values in a certain time
interval to determine power usage.
Figure 1.2: Diagram of DPA set up.
Both DPA and CPA are set up and acquire the power traces the same way, as
shown in 1.2:
• The attacker first chooses an intermediate variable of the executed algorithm to
focus the attack on. This intermediate variable needs to be a function of some
known data, the plaintext or ciphertext, and some part of the key. For example,
the output of the first round or input to the last round of the cryptographic
algorithm.
• The power consumption is collected while the device encrypts or decrypts each
message block. In this case, the device receives a plaintext from a PC, en-
crypts it, then sends the result back to the PC. When the device is performing
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encryption, the power consumption is collected with a digital oscilloscope by
measuring the voltage drop across a small resistor in series with the power or
ground wire of the power supply. For power analysis attacks, hundreds or thou-
sands of power consumption traces are needed depending on how noisy the data
is and the statistical analysis performed.
• With the knowledge of the plaintext or ciphertext, the attacker calculates the
Hamming weight of the intermediate variable corresponding to each power trace
for all 256 possible values of a key byte. DPA computes the Hamming weight on
one bit of the byte, and the range is either 0 or 1. CPA computes the Hamming
weight of the whole byte and the value ranges from 0 to 8.
• For every possible value of the key byte, the traces are then categorized accord-
ing to the calculated Hamming weight values. It is grouped into 2 categories
for DPA and 9 categories for CPA.
For DPA, we find the absolute value of the difference, Mi, of the mean of different
Hamming weight categories for each possible value of the key byte. For Mi = |HWi,0−
HWi,1| where i = 0....255, we find the maximum point of difference in the trace,
Max(Mi). If the guessed key byte is correct, there should be a distinct difference
between the mean power trace for Hamming weight of 0 and 1. If the key byte value
is guessed wrongly, then the category for each Hamming weight value contains power
traces that correspond to multiple different Hamming weight values and there’s not
much difference in the mean power traces. Thus the difference of mean should have
higher peaks for the correct key byte instead of the wrong key byte. The key guess
that produces the greatest difference in the categorized power consumption is the
correct key.
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The more advanced form of attack, CPA, uses the same method of data collection,
except we are looking for best correlation instead of maximum difference. For CPA,
the Pearson correlation coefficient for the 9 Hamming weight categories is calculated
for each possible value of a key byte. Pearson’s coefficient is obtained by dividing the
variance of the two variables by the product of their standard deviation. For power
trace W with Hamming weight H, the correlation coefficient is calculated with the
equation:
ρW,H =
N
∑
WH −∑W∑H√
N
∑
W 2 − (∑W )2√N∑H2 − (∑H)2 (1.1)
The value of the correlation coefficient is between 1 and -1. 0 indicates no linear
dependency while -1 and 1 indicates perfect linear dependency. The correct value for
the key byte is the one where the calculated Hamming weights correlate best to the
measured traces. This categorization and statistical analysis process is repeated for
each of the 16 bytes of the key.
The success of most side channel attacks depend on the quality and quantity of
side-channel data collected from the target device. Due to measurement limitations
and error from noise, the attacks often require hundreds or thousands of traces even
with elaborate signal processing methods [50], [24], [32], [54]. For cases where the
attacker has to work with far fewer traces due to implementation or risk of detection,
the template attack is a good option.
1.1.1 Template Attack
A template attack extracts all possible information available in each sample and is
hence one of the strongest side channel attacks possible in an information theoretic
sense. It requires more setup than other power analysis attacks since the attacker
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must have access to another copy of the protected device that they can fully control.
The attacker also needs to collect a large number of traces from it to create the
template, but the advantage is that it requires a very small number of traces from
the victim or target device. With good quality data or enough pre-processing, the
key may be recovered from just one trace.
The template attack stores the probability distribution of leaked information for
each device state. It uses the experimental device to derive a multivariate character-
ization of the noise, unlike other power analysis attacks that focuses on eliminating
the noise by averaging [8]. Signal classification techniques are then used to assign
a captured trace to a device state. Unlike other power analysis attacks, template
attacks usually consist of two phases: a training phase that characterizes the power
consumption of the implementation and create a template for each possible value of
the target variable, the secret key; and a attack phase where the the power consump-
tion of the target device is measured then matched with the templates to find the
secret key.
While a template attack requires fewer power traces than other power analysis
attacks, it is computationally intensive, the execution time and storage requirements
are very high [41].
All the power analysis attacks are done one byte at a time with the process
repeated for each byte of the key until the attacker has acquired the full key. Power
analysis attacks are relatively easy to implement, do not require detailed knowledge
of the attacked device (only the attacked algorithm), and can be performed on even
small and noisy power leaks.
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1.2 Countermeasures
The goal of countermeasures against power analysis attacks is to make the power
consumption of the cryptographic device independent of the intermediate values of
the executed algorithm. The countermeasures in general can be categorized as either
hiding or masking [28].
Hiding refers to removing the data dependency of the power consumption by
randomizing the execution of the algorithm, randomizing the power consumption, or
make it so the device consumes equal amount of power in each clock cycle. For ex-
ample, if the output should be 4, the operation used could be 5− 1 or 3 + 1. Random
delays or shuffling can be done to make it more difficult to pinpoint the exact moment
of power consumption with the intermediate variables. As for countermeasure on the
power consumption side, it is also possible to increase noise, where random switching
activity dominates the power consumption, or reduce the signal, where all operations
require an equal amount of power for all data inputs. Dual-rail logic can be used
for latter, where the complement is computed at the same time as the cryptographic
operation for a constant power consumption. However, in practice the data depen-
dency cannot be removed completely, there will always be a certain amount of data
dependency that can be extracted with enough good data or statistical analysis to
help identify the patterns.
On the other hand, masking randomizes the intermediate values so the power
consumption correlates with the randomized value instead of the actual intermediate
values. Each intermediate value v is concealed by a random value m called a mask via
boolean or arithmetic operation. Typically the masks are directly applied to the plain-
text or the key so in this case the power consumption correlates to operation(v,m, k)
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instead of operation(v, k). The mask is generated internally and varies from execu-
tion to execution. However, this countermeasure has a relatively high overhead since
the implementation of the algorithm needs to be slightly changed in order to process
the masked intermediate values and to keep track of the masks, which needs to be
removed at end of the computation to obtain the ciphertext. It is also important
to make sure that every intermediate value is masked all the time and that different
masks do not cancel each other out during the process. While this countermeasure
protects against first-order power analysis, which analyzes one intermediate variable,
it is vulnerable to second-order power analysis attack that preprocess the power traces
then exploit the joint leakage of two intermediate values. While it is possible to use
higher order masking for higher order attacks, the efficiency and security decreases
with each order added [40, 53]
While there are multiple ways to make it more difficult to perform side-channel
attacks, there are no ways to make it completely secure. Due to the large quantity
of traces needed, the best way is to update the key as frequently as possible. The
fewer power measurements an attacker can obtain for a fixed key, the more difficult
it is to reveal the key with power analysis. One of the methods to mitigate this
disadvantage is to combine SCA with algebraic analysis [42]. This attack is called
Algebraic Side-channel Attack (ASCA).
1.3 Algebraic Side-Channel Attack (ASCA)
Algebraic analysis is a mathematical attack where the attacker expresses the crypto-
graphic algorithm as a system of equations, then puts it through a solver, along with
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known variables such as the plaintext or ciphertext, to solve for the key. However,
depending on the complexity of the algorithm, information from only the algorithm
may not be enough to solve for the key. Side-channel attacks (SCA) use information
leaked during the encryption or decryption of the algorithm and the knowledge of the
algorithm to guess the key using brute force attack and statistical analysis. Algebraic
Side-Channel Attack combines both algebraic and side-channel attacks, mitigating
some of the disadvantages from both attacks. The Hamming weights information
acquired from template attack and equations of the cryptographic algorithm are both
expressed as a system of equations and put through a solver to solve for the secret
key[42].
SCA employs a divide-and-conquer strategy and finds the key one byte at time
while ASCA has low data complexity and recovers the whole key at once. In addition
to a large quantity of power traces, SCA focuses on the first or last round of the
algorithm and requires the attacker to know the plaintext or ciphertext. ASCA can
utilize side-channel information from any or all rounds of the algorithm and only
requires 1-3 power traces to succeed. Lastly, ASCA can also succeed in unknown
plaintext/ciphertext scenarios.
1.3.1 Setups
ASCA consists of two phases. First, an online phase where the attacker collects
power traces from the target device and uses a template attack, a variation of power
analysis attack, to extract the side channel information. Then, an offline phase that
models the cryptographic algorithm and the side-channel information as a system of
equations. The equations are then put through a solver to solve for the secret key.
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The process is illustrated in Figure 1.3.
Figure 1.3: Algebraic Side-Channel Analysis.
The measurement setups for the attack usually consists of the following compo-
nents:
• Cryptographic device: This is the device under attack (DUT) that encrypts
or decrypts the data. It communicates with a PC, which sends over commands
to trigger execution of the cryptographic algorithm and receives the results
of the encryption or decryption. ASCA assumes the attacker has access to a
device identical to the target device. The device from attacker should emit a
measurable side-channel leakage, such as power consumption, during encryption
or decryption that can be controlled and used to build a template for extracting
data.
• Power supply: The cryptographic devices usually need an external power
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supply. The power supplied needs to be stable and is usually 5V. The power
for a smart card for example is provided by a smart card reader.
• Oscilloscope: The power consumption should be capturable with an oscillo-
scope with an error rate that the solver can handle, usually 500MHz with a
sampling rate of 2-5 Gs/s [15, 31] for a 10-20 MHz microcontroller. The oscil-
loscope should be able to capture the power trace and send it over to a PC for
records.
• Personal computer: The PC controls the whole measurement set up by send-
ing trigger signal to the DUT to start the encryption or decryption process,
stores the measured power traces from the oscilloscope, and performs the at-
tack based on the data acquired.
Aside from differences between equipment set ups, the quality of the measurement
is determined by the amount of noise present in the power traces. The total noise
consists of electronic noise and switching noise. Electronic noise is why the power
consumption may differ slightly every time the device performs the same operation
with the same data and includes the noise from the power supply or neighboring elec-
tronic devices. Switching noise corresponds to the power consumption of all logic cells
of the DUT not relevant to the specific attack and depends mainly on the bandwidth
of the connection of the logic cells to the oscilloscope and on the frequency of the
clock signal.
While the hardware or measurement setup is usually the same for all ASCA, the
software used differs depending on the methods used. The PC should have a software
that communicates with the oscilloscope to collect the data, a software used to model
14
the data as well as the algorithm as algebraic equations, and a solver that can take
in the set of equations and output a solution.
1.3.2 Process
The first ASCA was proposed in 2009 and successfully performed on PRESENT im-
plemented on an 8-bit microcontroller [43]. The attack has since then been performed
on a simulation of Keelog on an ASIC [33], and variations of AES that are simulated
or implemented on an 8-bit microcontroller [42, 61, 36, 34, 31, 35, 56, 48, 15, 37].
The original ASCA assumes all Hamming weights are correct and did not take error
from side channel information into account when creating the algebraic model. The
current attacks that do account for possible errors are called error tolerant ASCA, or
TASCA. The attack consists of the following steps:
• Identify potential leaks. The side-channel leakages used here are power
consumption traces. The set up for collecting the power traces from the cry-
tographic device is the same as that outlined in the previous section for power
analysis attack.
• Profile DUT and devise a decoding process. The side-channel leakages,
or power traces, are acquired from the DUT in the attacker’s possession and
a template is created using a template attack. For the decoding process, the
attacker uses a multivariate Gaussian model to map the side-channel informa-
tion to the Hamming weight of the intermediate values in the algorithm [35].
Since the information extracted is Hamming weight, in this case we want to
have thousands of traces for each possible Hamming weight value (for example,
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2000 traces for each of the 9 Hamming weight categories). For each Hamming
weight category, the mean and covariances are calculated for the template of
that Hamming weight value.
• Acquire power traces from target and decode the Hamming weights.
In this phase, the attacker accesses the target device to collect a few power
traces from it with an oscilloscope. The template created from the previous
step is used as a reference to extract Hamming weights from the target power
traces.
• Model the DUT and side-channel information as set of algebraic equa-
tions. The formal description of the algorithm and the Hamming weights from
the side-channel information are represented as a system of equations.
• Solve for the secret key. Given the model, as well as plaintext or ciphertext
if desired, the solver finds the solution that satisfies the model, which should be
the correct secret key.
The objectives of the attack are to acquire the key with a high success rate using
the least amount of information and in a reasonable amount of time. Depending on
the complexity of the model and the accuracy of the data, the attack may take a long
time or output a wrong solution.
One popular way to optimize it is to combine the attack with fault injection.
Faults can be generated by changing the power supply voltage, the clock frequency
or intense external stimuli. Both the correct and faulty encryption are modeled as
algebraic equations along with the side channel information to be put through the
solver. The attack has successfully been done on algorithms such as LED [58] and
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GOST[60]. In addition to collecting the power traces, the attacker needs to be able
to inject faults into the device and know the location of the fault. Aside from the
additional requirements, this also turns the passive attack into active attack and
thus makes it more detectable. This negates some of the advantages of SCA and
TASCA. Another method, SASCA, is proposed in [56] where the AES Furious and
template information are modeled as a factor graph that can be efficiently decoded by
Belief Propagation Algorithm, which found the most possible key from low-density
parity check codes. The performance of SASCA, ASCA and DPA based on real
data are compared in [15]. SASCA performs better than ASCA but is generally
more computationally intensive than divide-and-conquer (DPA) attacks. When there
are a lot of traces available, the gain of SASCA over DPA is limited. If plaintext
or ciphertext is unknown, then SASCA may be the best option. The amount and
type of leakage samples exploitable are what made SASCA more or less powerful.
The resolution time for ASCA depends on the quantity of information, whereas it is
independent of this quantity in SASCA.
This dissertation explores the practicality and application of TASCA, a passive
attack that only utilizes power traces collected during encryption or decryption and
knowledge of the algorithm.
1.4 Problem Statement and Motivation
Since the attack targets the implementation of the cryptographic algorithm, even the
most mathematically secure algorithm may still be vulnerable to it. However, the
practicality and success of TASCA depend on the amount of information that can
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be expressed as equations and the accuracy of the data. When there is insufficient
information or when the algorithm is particularly complex, the solver may output
no solution or multiple solutions. If the information has a margin of error, then
the results may not be accurate. This dissertation examines the practicality and
application of ASCA by examining its performance pushing the boundary at each of
the three stages of the attack.
1.4.1 Algebraic Model
While TASCA and ASCA have been done successfully on smaller algorithms with
64-bit keys, it has never been done on larger or more complex algorithm with 128-bit
keys like Twofish. Compared to other algorithms that have been attacked, Twofish
is more difficult to attack due to the key-dependent S-boxes as well as the complex
key scheduling. This makes Twofish immune to many attacks using traditional s-box
statistics. Twofish also divides the message block into smaller blocks and performs
different operations on each sub block at the same time, this makes it more difficult to
isolate the correlation between data or operation with the power consumption within
each round.
Not only does this make the Twofish algorithm much more complex to model, it
also means that less Hamming weights may be extracted or used per round. With
more complex equations and the smaller amount of information available, the perfor-
mance and accuracy may decrease. In this dissertation, we propose the first algebraic
side-channel attack on Twofish. We examine the importance of different types of
Hamming weight side-channel information in getting past the key-dependent S-boxes
and the complex key scheduling.
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While the amount of side channel information provided is less than most of the
other algorithms, the complexity of the model was reduced when switching from a
psuedo-boolean model with SAT solver to a CP model. This allows for a slightly
faster solving time and improved success rate.
1.4.2 Solving for the Key and Error Tolerance
While ASCA has been proven to work on popular algorithms such as AES and pop-
ular platforms such as 8-bit microcontrollers, one major disadvantage of ASCA is
its limited ability to tolerate error. The extracted side channel information is sus-
ceptible to error depending on the noise, equipment and statistical analysis used to
extract the information from the device leakage. Taking this into account drastically
increases the complexity of the model, which may cause a significant increase in the
runtime as well as the memory consumption. Traditionally the algorithm and side
channel information are modeled as boolean equations input into a SAT solver. For
this chapter, a bit-vector model is used with a constraint programming (CP) solver,
which is more accommodating towards error. This makes the model much simpler
and easier to solve.
In this dissertation, we explore the attack by examining the importance of various
operations and accuracy of the Hamming weights in terms of success of the attack.
The attacker may not have the time or opportunity to collect multiple traces from
the target but ASCA attack can succeed with only 1 or 2 traces. Using more traces is
not necessarily better since it may increase the complexity of the algorithm without
reducing the error. Thus, this knowledge will help the attacker to select which trace
to use. By picking the trace with less error in side channel information of the impor-
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tant operations, the accuracy and runtime of the attack may increase. In addition,
this will allow us to gain insights into possible areas of focus for countermeasures.
Current countermeasures such as adding randomness or delays into the implementa-
tion drastically increases the overhead without much increase in security. However,
by identifying and protecting important operations instead of the whole algorithm,
the cost of implementation may be reduced.
1.4.3 Extracting Information from Leakage
While most of the focus for ASCA has been focusing on applying it to different
algorithms or models, it is important to also take a look at the platform of the
cryptographic implementation. The first stage of the attack is extracting side channel
information from leakage of the device. A pure side channel attack using power traces
has been proven to work on a variety of platforms including 8-bit microcontrollers, 32-
bit ASICs, microprocessors and FPGAs. However, past research on ASCA or TASCA
has only been done on 8-bit microcontroller data or simulated data. If SCA is feasible
for a certain platform or implementation, then ASCA should be feasible as well with
better performance. In this dissertation, we explore the application and feasibility
of TASCA on a different platform that is gaining popularity, field-programmable
gate array (FPGA). We examines the differences and methods, more specifically the
points of interests, of extracting Hamming weights as well as factors that influence
the success of the attack from the data collection stage.
FPGAs run faster and it is more difficult for an encryption power trace to be
isolated so it presents more of a challenge for the attacker. While there have been
side-channel attacks performed on FPGA, TASCA on FPGA is different since we are
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extracting Hamming weights instead of the secret key. For pure SCA that extract
the secret key, the attacker can compare results from multiple traces using the same
key to eliminate some of the wrong guesses. However, TASCA uses SCA to extract
Hamming weights for each byte of intermediate values, which are independent of
each other so some of the statistical analysis or filtering techniques used to improve
the accuracy of the template attack does not apply to ASCA. Being able to extract
usable side-channel information is crucial for accuracy of TASCA, so it is worthwhile
to examine side channel information extracted from different platforms.
1.4.4 Contributions
To summarize, this dissertation shows that ASCA can be successful even on Twofish,
a more complex algorithm with keyed s-box and complex key scheduling, which makes
most attacks more difficult. By improving the performance of the attack with differ-
ent model and solver, this dissertation shows that ASCA is able to succeed with wider
range of error from side channel information and that errors on different operations
have different influence on the success and runtime of the attack. This dissertation
also shows the attack is feasible not only for algorithms implemented on 8-bit micro-
controllers or simulated data, but on more complex platform such as FPGAs as well.
The success and performance of the attack is mainly affected by the accuracy of the
side channel information as well as the model and solver used.
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1.5 Dissertation Organization
This dissertation has five chapters. This chapter provided an introduction for disser-
tation research definition and motivation. The second chapter explores the feasiblity
of the attack on a more complex algebraic model, Twofish. Chapter three explores
how different operations and errors from the data affects the solving time and accu-
racy for the key. The next chapter examines the application of TASCA on different
devices by exploring the information extracted from side-channel leakage and its er-
ror distribution. Finally, chapter five concludes this dissertation by presenting the
summary, contributions and future work.
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Chapter 2
ASCA on TwoFish
2.1 Introduction
Twofish is a symmetric key block cipher and one of the five finalists of the Advanced
Encryption Standard contest. It is generally recognized as a secure block cipher
due to its unique implementation and is used in many areas from file encryption
to password management. Usually, a block cipher would divide the plaintext into
blocks, then perform rounds of operations and combine them with the key to produce
the ciphertext. The operations in each round typically consist of XORing the input
with the key, S-boxes, shifts and multiplications. For Twofish, however, each block
is further divided into four, each of which is then put through different operations
within each round. Twofish also uses key-dependent S-boxes and has a relatively
complex key scheduling. Because the S-boxes are key-dependent, Twofish is thus
immune to many attacks based on traditional S-box statistics. The round keys used
in the cryptographic algorithms are generated in key scheduling from the master key.
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Not only does the key scheduling of Twofish uses complex operations, each round key
is calculated with a key-dependent S-box as well [46].
While there have been some promising attacks on Twofish [25, 14], they are done
on reduced-round versions and not the full version. Differential fault analysis has
been a little more successful on Twofish. By focusing on the S-box keys, the attack
is able to acquire the complete key under 8 hours [1]. However, fault injection is an
active attack that interferes with the cryptographic device. It is, thus, detectable and
can be countered with error-correcting countermeasures.
This chapter examines whether Twofish can be broken via an algebraic side-
channel attack (ASCA), a passive attack where the cryptographic algorithm and
side-channel information are expressed as a set of algebraic equations. The equations
are then put through a solver to find the secret key. The practicality and success
of an algebraic attack depend on the amount of information that can be expressed
as equations and, moreover, the information must be correct. When there is insuf-
ficient information, the solver may output no solution or multiple solutions. If the
information has a margin of error, then the results may not be accurate. However,
it is possible to increase the success rate of finding the key by combining different
attacks, or in this case, combining algebraic analysis with side-channel information.
Side-channel attacks are based on the idea that seemingly harmless leakage from the
cryptosystem, such as power consumption or electromagnetic waves, can be exploited
to break the cryptographic algorithm and find the key. However, this attack is depen-
dent on the accuracy of the data, knowledge of the plaintext or ciphertext and only
targets one key byte at a time. By combining both attacks, algebraic side-channel
attack can bypass some of those problems [42]. ASCA is different from side-channel
attacks in that it potentially exploits leakages of all rounds instead of just the first
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or the last round, and the solver will output the complete key at once. By incor-
porating algebraic analysis with side-channel attack, it can also succeed in unknown
plaintext/ciphertext scenario and requires less leakage information.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: section 2.2 starts with an
overview of the Twofish algorithm and its unique characteristics. Section 2.3 examines
the model used for algebraic side-channel attack, while the attack is implemented in
section 2.4. The results of the attack is analyzed in section 2.5 and the chapter
concludes in section 2.7.
2.2 TwoFish Overview
Twofish is a symmetric key block cipher with key sizes of 128 bits, 192 bits or 256
bits. For our implementation, Twofish-128 is used. The following notations are used
to describe the algorithms:
• P for plaintext
• C for ciphertext
• K for key
• R for round
• F and g represent the functions in each round
There are three sets of keys used in Twofish, S0 and S1 for the key-dependent
S-boxes in each round of Twofish, Me and Mo for the key-dependent S-boxes in key
scheduling, and 40 round keys (K0, K1...K39). As for the actual Twofish algorithm,
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it first splits the block of 128 bits plaintext into four 32-bit words. The four words
are then XORed with the subkeys K0, K1, K2 and K3 during input whitening. The
result is then put through 16 rounds, where two keys are used in each round from (K8,
K9) to (K38, K39), then XORed with another set of subkeys in the output whitening
phase (K4, K5, K6 and K7) to produce the final ciphertext.
Figure 2.1: Twofish [45]
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2.2.1 Round Operations
Twofish round function uses a Feistel network structure, a general method of trans-
forming any function into a permutation. A Feistel structure is a symmetric structure
used in construction of block ciphers such as DES, Blowfish, RC5, GOST and Twofish.
For basic Feistel round, the input block is split into two equal pieces where one piece
is changed by being XORed with a function of the other half. Since the other half
has not changed, it is still available after the round is over. Thus, even if the function
is not invertible, the round is still invertible. Unlike the substitution-permutation
round structure used in AES, which has to be invertible for decryption to be possible,
the round function does not have to be invertible in the Feistel structure, which is
another advantage of Twofish.
In each Feistel round, Ri, the four input words (32 bits) come from the previous
round Ri−1 except for round R0 where the input comes from input whitening. The
first two words of round Ri are put through the F function, the outputs are XORed
with the last two words from Ri to become the first two words of the next round,
Ri+1. The first two words of Ri become the last two words of the next round Ri+1.
The operations in the F function of Twofish consist of:
• S-box substitution of bytes
• Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) matrix mixing of bytes
• Pseudo-Hadamard transform (PHT) mixing of words
• Sub-key modular add of words
Equation 2.1 illustrates the operations of the F function. The inputs are denoted
as R0 and R1, and the outputs are denoted as F0 and F1. The round number r is
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another input of F and is used to calculate the round key for that round.
T0 = g(R0)
T1 = g(ROL(R1, 8))
F0 = (T0 + T1 +K2r+8)mod2
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F1 = (T0 + 2T1 +K2r+9)mod2
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(2.1)
The input to the F function first goes through the g function, which consists of
the key-dependent S-boxes and MDS matrix. The output of g function then goes
through PHT, a simple mixing operation responsible for diffusion, and XORed with
the two round keys to become the output of the F function.
The g function in the F function consists of the key-dependent S-box and matrix
multiplication. Because the S-boxes of most algorithms are not key-dependent, they
are commonly expressed as lookup tables. However, the S-box step of Twofish in
Figure 2.1 actually consists of a series of operations. The input word of the S-box is
first divided into four bytes. Each byte, x, is inputted into the permutation functions
as detailed in equation 2.7, where a and b are the first and last 4 bits of the input,
t0, t1, t2 and t3 are 4-bit lookup tables and y is the output. The output of the
permutation function is XORed with the S-box key S0, the process is repeated again
with S-box key S1, then it goes through a last round of permutation.
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a0, b0 = bx/16c, xmod16
a1 = a0 ⊕ b0
b1 = a0 ⊕ROR4(b0, 1)⊕ 8a0mod16
a2, b2 = t0ba1c, t1bb1c
a3 = a2 ⊕ b2
b3 = a2 ⊕ROR4(b2, 1)⊕ 8a2mod16
a4, b4 = t2ba3c, t3bb3c
y = 16b4 + a4
(2.2)
After the four bytes of the state go through the S-box function, they are then
combined and multiplied with a matrix of constants for the MDS step. While the
S-box is mainly responsible for providing confusion in the algorithm, MDS is the
main diffusion element in Twofish. A matrix is categorized as MDS matrix if all its
sub matrices are non-singular. This guarantees that if a single input changes, all
the outputs are bound to change and helps to create maximum randomness. This
completes the g function part of the F function for each round [45].
2.2.2 Key Scheduling
Key scheduling produces the two sets of keys used in the Twofish algorithm: the keys
for the S-boxes, denoted as S0, S1, and 40 keys for the input/output whitening and
each round. To calculate the S-box keys, the 128-bit master key is first separated into
four words, M0, M1, M2 and M3. The first two words are multiplied with a matrix of
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Figure 2.2: The g function for each round of Twofish, and h function for the key
scheduling.
constants, RS, to produce S0 and the last two words produce S1 as shown in equation
2.3.
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
si,0
si,1
si,2
si,3

= RS ·

m8i
m8i+1
m8i+2
m8i+3
m8i+4
m8i+5
m8i+6
m8i+7

(2.3)
To produce the round keys K0 to K39, the key scheduling uses h function, which
is the same as the g function for each round of Twofish, as illustrated in Figure 2.2.
The only difference being that key scheduling uses M0, M1, M2 and M3 from the
master key for the S-boxes and the inputs to the h function are 2i and 2i + 1 where
the value of i goes from 0 to 19. This produces 40 round keys of 32-bit each, where
K0 to K7 are used for input/output whitening and K8 to K39 are used during each
round of Twofish as illustrated in Figure 2.1 [44].
2.3 Attack Model
The attack used in this chapter is algebraic side-channel attack. While ASCA has
been done successfully on smaller algorithms with 64-bit keys, it has never been done
on larger or more complex algorithms with 128-bit keys like Twofish. Compared to
other algorithms that ASCA has been used on, Twofish is also more difficult to attack
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due to the key-dependent S-boxes as well as the complex key scheduling.
To launch the attack, the algorithm and the side-channel derived Hamming weights
are modeled as a set of Boolean equations in conjunctive normal form (CNF). The
CNF equation sets are conjunctions of one or more clauses. A clause is a disjunction
of literals that may not repeat inside a clause. A literal is a Boolean variable with
value of 0 or 1. For CNF equations, the only propositional connectives it can contain
are AND (conjunction), OR (disjunction) and NOT (negation). The NOT can be
used as part of the literal. For example, the equation (A∨B)∧C is in CNF, but the
equation (A ∧ B) ∨ C is not CNF. All logical formulae can be converted into CNF
using rules such as double negative law, De Morgan’s law or distributive law. The
set of CNF equations are then put through a SAT solver to solve for the key.
Satisfiability solvers are programs that employ highly optimized mathematical al-
gorithms to decide whether a set of constraints have a solution. Given a propositional
equation for a set of Boolean variables, a SAT solver determines if there exists an
assignment of the variables such that the formula evaluates to true. If not, then it
proves that no such assignment exists.
2.4 Technical Approach
To launch the attack, we first model the algorithm and the side-channel derived Ham-
ming weights as a set of conjunctive normal form (CNF) equations. The equations are
then put through the solver CryptoMiniSAT 5.0, which supports XOR operations, to
solve for the key.
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2.4.1 Twofish CNF Form
The CNF equation literals represent the input and output bits as well as all interme-
diate variables in Twofish. The round and F function of Twofish are based on the
following key operations:
• XOR for byte and word
• SHIFT for byte and word
• ADD for word
• MULT used in RS and MDS matrix multiplication
• SBOX implemented as byte-wise lookup tables
While XOR and SHIFT are not difficult to represent in CNF, converting ADD,
MULT, and SBOX to binary equations in CNF proves to be quite challenging.
ADD requires extra intermediate variables to function as carryover during the
operation. For example, the carryover variable x3 for the inputs x2 and x1 are written
as x1x3+x2x3+x1x2x3. The 32-bit ADD is then implemented as a loop of bit addition.
For each bit, the two input bits are XORed with the carryover bit from the previous
iteration. The carryover bits are then calculated and XORed for a final carryover bit
to be used for the next iteration.
MULT is byte-wise multiplication and used during matrix multiplication for the
S-box key and Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) step of the round function. The
byte multiplication is done in Galois Field, where the two input bytes are expressed
as polynomial equations with each bit represented by a variable. The Galois Field
used here is a finite field with two elements, denoted as GF (2). Multiplication in
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finite field is multiplication modulo an irreducible reducing polynomial used to define
the finite field. For example, a 4-bit variable in Galois Field would be expressed
with polynomial GF (24) = x3 + x2 + x+ 1. The binary value 0010 is expressed as x
and the binary value 1011 is expressed as (x3 + x + 1) in GF (24). To multiply the
two binary variables in Galois Field with irreducible polynomial x4 + x+ 1 would be
x(x3 + x+ 1) = x4 + x2 + x = (x+ 1) + x2 + x = x2 + 1, and the final result would be
0101. For Twofish, the byte-wise multiplication done in GF (28) is converted to CNF
equations using SageMath, a mathematical software. The polynomial equations are
multiplied and reduced, after which the coefficients of the binary variables become
the equation for the resulting byte of the multiplication [3]. Table 2.1 shows the CNF
equations for the MDS matrix multiplication when the input byte, represented by bit
variables x0 to x7, is multiplied by MDS in equation 2.4 to produce the output byte,
represented by bit variables y0 to y7.
Table 2.1: MDS
Y 01 02 EF 5B
y0 x0 x1 x0 + x6 + x7 x0 + x6
y1 x1 x0 + x2 x0 + x1 + x7 x1 + x7
y2 x2 x0 + x3 x0 + x1 + x2 + x6 + x7 x0 + x2 + x6
y3 x3 x4 x1 + x2 + x3 + x6 x1 + x3 + x6 + x7
y4 x4 x0 + x5 x2 + x3 + x4 + x7 x2 + x4 + x7
y5 x5 x6 x3 + x4 + x5 + x6 + x7 x3 + x5 + x6
y6 x6 x7 x4 + x5 + x6 + x7 x4 + x6 + x7
y7 x7 x0 x5 + x6 + x7 x5 + x7
Once the equation set for byte multiplication is done, the matrix multiplication
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step of Twofish is just a matter of looping through the matrix, doing byte multipli-
cation and adding up the appropriate bytes.
MDS =

01 EF 5B 5B
5B EF EF 01
EF 5B 01 EF
EF 01 EF 5B

(2.4)
The equations are derived in a similar manner for the multiplication to get the S-box
key.
The SBOX step of Twofish is the most complicated component to model because
it is key-dependent. Instead of just a lookup table used by most other algorithms,
Twofish’s SBOX step consists of XORing the S-box key and the permutation functions
q0 and q1. Both permutation functions consist of the same operations, shown in Figure
2.7, but use four different sets of S-boxes. In total, there are eight S-boxes, which
can be represented as lookup table consists of 4-bits. The equations of the lookup
table are produced using the S-box feature in SageMath. Each bit of the output is an
equation of monomials that are input bits of the lookup table. The 4-bit lookup table
of t0 in the function q0 produces equation 2.5, where x0 to x3 are the 4-bit variables
of the input and y0 to y3 are the 4-bit variables of the output:
y0 =1 + x0 + x1 + x2 + x3 + x0 ∗ x2 + x1 ∗ x2 + x0 ∗ x1 ∗ x2 + x0 ∗ x1 ∗ x3 + x1 ∗ x2 ∗ x3
y1 =x1 + x2 + x0 ∗ x2 ∗ x3
y2 =x1 + x2 + x0 ∗ x2 + x0 ∗ x3 + x1 ∗ x2 + x2 ∗ x3 + x0 ∗ x1 ∗ x2 + x1 ∗ x2 ∗ x3
y3 =x2 + x3 + x2 ∗ x3 + x0 ∗ x1 ∗ x2 + x0 ∗ x1 ∗ x3 + x1 ∗ x2 ∗ x3
(2.5)
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The same method is used to produce the lookup table for t1, t2, and t3.
After all the basic operations have been converted to CNF form, we can then
write the complete key scheduling and the round function for the Twofish algorithm.
We verified the CNF model by checking it against the standard C implementation of
Twofish to make sure that it produces the correct ciphertext, when given a plaintext
and the key. We can then add SCA information into the system of CNF equations
and begin the attack.
2.4.2 Side-Channel Information
For ASCA attacks, the side-channel information used is usually deduced from tem-
plate attacks. The side-channel information, or the Hamming weight, counts the
number of 1’s in the data set and are correlated with the power consumption for the
intermediate variables. In 2009, Renauld et al. showed that, with error detection
and likelihood rating, the Hamming weights of intermediate values can be obtained
from power traces with an error rate of at most 1% [42]. Thus, for our attack,
we assume that the Hamming weights are all correct and generated them from the
encryption process. While we did not perform side-channel attack to collect the Ham-
ming weights, there are a number of approaches that have been demonstrated that
one could use to collect this information. Side-channel information can be acquired
by collecting power consumption data and observing the location of the power trace
from template attacks. Since the power consumption does not strictly correlate with
the operation and data during every step of the algorithm, where to extract Hamming
weights is also important. The following operations are cryptographic computational
kernels that are commonly susceptible to power leakage [22, 11, 17]:
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• Data access to/from registers.
• Rotations and shifts.
• Data-dependent offset.
• Bitwise boolean operations.
In short, side-channel information such as Hamming weights can be leaked from
almost every step of the algorithm from addition to XORing the key to the S-boxes.
However, it is a little different for Twofish. Unlike most algorithms where every byte
of the block goes through the same set of operations at the same time, Twofish divides
the block into four words, each of which goes through a different set of operations and
interacts with each other before being combined again for the next round. Because
of this, it would be impractical to assume we can get Hamming weights for every
operation within the round. Thus, for this attack only the Hamming weights of
input/output whitening and between each round are used [7].
Each block of Twofish is 128 bits, or 16 bytes. To calculate the Hamming weights,
we count the number of 1s in each of the 16 bytes for each round. The Hamming
weight of each byte depends on the value of the byte. To model it as CNF equations,
each bit of the byte is represented by variables x0, x1...x7. The Hamming weights are
expressed as sets of equations. For each possible Hamming weight value, the equation
set consists of one equation that is the XOR of all bit variables and seven equations
that are the ORs of the bit variables ANDed together. Equation 2.6 shows the set
of equations for Hamming weight of 1. This means only one bit variable of the byte
has a value of 1, so the XOR of all the bit variables equal to 1 while the rest of the
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equations equal to 0.
x0 ⊕ x1 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x7 = 1
x0 ∗ x1 + x0 ∗ x2 + x0 ∗ x3 + x0 ∗ x4 + x0 ∗ x5 + x0 ∗ x6 + ....+ x6 ∗ x7 = 0
x0 ∗ x1 ∗ x2 + x0 ∗ x1 ∗ x3 + x0 ∗ x1 ∗ x4 + x0 ∗ x1 ∗ x5 + x0 ∗ x1 ∗ x6
+x0 ∗ x1 ∗ x7 + ....+ x5 ∗ x6 ∗ x7 = 0
...
x0 ∗ x1 ∗ x2 ∗ x3 ∗ x4 ∗ x5 ∗ x6 ∗ x7 = 0
(2.6)
If the Hamming weight of the byte is 2, then the equation of the two variable mono-
mials should equal to 1 since one of the monomials should be the AND of the two
bit variables with value of 1. The rest of the equations equal to 0 and so on. For
Hamming weight of 8, all bits of the byte have value of 1, so the equation of XOR
should equal 0 while all other equations should equal to 1.
While the accuracy of the side-channel information depends on the noise in the
data collected and may compromise the accuracy of the equations for ASCA, this
problem can be reduced by using multiple deductions-based algebraic side-channel
attack [61]. For this attack, multiple sets of possible solutions are produced, thus
maximize the possibility of finding the correct key. The attack can be further opti-
mized by exploiting the incomplete diffusion feature in one AES round, where it can
exploit the side-channel leaks in all AES rounds using a single power trace with less
time complexity [16]. The noise can also be taken into account by introducing an
error variable or bit in the set of Hamming weights, such attack is known as Tolerant
ASCA[37].
A set of 16 Hamming weights are used for each round. The Hamming weights
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are modeled as CNF equations and combined with the CNF equations of the Twofish
algorithm. The set of equations is then used with a SAT solver to solve for the key.
2.4.3 CryptoMiniSAT Solver
For this attack, we choose to use CryptoMiniSAT 5.0. CryptoMiniSAT is an extension
of MiniSAT, a conflict-driven SAT solver that employs a backtracking-based, depth-
first search algorithm to find a satisfying variable assignment for a system of clauses.
CryptoMiniSAT is tailored towards solving crytographic problems by including the
handling of XOR natively, which allows it to perform better than the traditional
MiniSAT solver. An ASCA attack on the algorithm PRESENT-80 only needs 9
rounds of leakages to obtain the full key with unknown plaintext/ciphertext instead
of the 26 rounds of previous works [20].
To check for correctness, the plaintext and key are used in the standard C im-
plementation of Twofish to generate the ciphertext. The same set of plaintext and
ciphertext are given to the solver along with the ASCA equations to solve for the key.
2.4.4 Conflict Driven Clause Learning
CDCL is an algorithm for solving Boolean satisfiability problems used by CryptoMin-
iSAT. Given a Boolean formula, the SAT problem asks for an assignment of variables
so that the entire formula evaluates to true. The internal working of CDCL solvers are
inspired by DPLL solvers, which is primarily based on backtrack search. However,
CDCL can learn new clauses and backtrack non-chronologically. Conflict analysis
uses resolution operation to infer new clauses from the original clauses and other
learnt clauses. Conflict-driven clause learning works as follows [29].
39
• Decision state: select a variable and assign True or False to it.
• Unit propagation: apply Boolean constraint propagation.
• Build the implication graph.
• Resolving conflict: If there is any conflict, find the cut in the implication graph
that led to the conflict then derive a new clause which is the negation of the
assignments that led to the conflict. Lastly, non-chronologically backtrack to
the appropriate decision level, where the first-assigned variable involved in the
conflict was assigned.
The decision phase will repeat the steps until either all variables have been as-
signed or a conflict has occurred. Alternatively, the solver may stop execution of
the algorithm when all clauses are satisfied. However, in modern SAT solvers that
use lazy data structures, clause state cannot be maintained accurately and so the
termination criterion is usually determined by whether all variables are assigned. It
is possible that CryptoMiniSAT stopped solving in this case when the variables are
all assigned instead of when all clauses are satisfied.
2.5 Results
The ciphertexts for 100 random input-key pairs are generated for the attack. The
attack is done on a PC with a 1.7GHz Intel Haswell x64 processor. The first attempt
uses algebraic attack only with no side-channel information to solve for the 128-bit
key of the full algorithm. In this case, we are unable to solve for any part of the key
even when the plaintext and ciphertext are given. Using side-channel information,
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when we attempt to solve for the full 128 bits key of the full algorithm, the solver is
unable to find a solution within 7 days. However, when 32 bits of the 128 bits key are
fixed, the solver is able to correctly solve for the other 96 bits in under 2 hours. Since
the Twofish key is separated into four words when used in the algorithm, we decide
to solve for 96, 64, 32 bits of the key and analyze the performance of the attack under
two scenarios:
• Is plaintext and/or ciphertext needed for the ASCA on Twofish?
• How much Hamming weight is needed?
In all the experiments and scenarios, the partial keys being solved are correct as
long as the solver is able to give an output. Thus, the analysis of the chapter focuses
on the efficiency of the attack.
Table 2.2: Solving time (in seconds) using all Hamming weights.
Key solved Plaintext/Ciphertext Plaintext Ciphertext
1 word 51.08 31.03 35.84
2 word 959.72 - -
3 word 3711.74 - -
For the first case of ASCA, we analyze the importance of known plaintext or
ciphertext when solving for 1 word, 2 words or 3 words of the key. When given 96
bits of the key (3 words) and solving for 32 bits of the key (1 word), the plaintext or
ciphertext only scenario are actually faster than when both plaintext and ciphertext
are given. This may be due to the fact that, with more information to take into
account, the solver is overconstrained and thus takes longer to find the solution.
However, when we attempt to solve for more parts of the key, 2 words or 3 words,
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the plaintext or ciphertext only scenario is unable to solve for it within 24 hours. We
are also unable to solve for any part of the key when given Hamming weights only,
so plaintext and ciphertext do drastically decrease the time needed for a successful
attack. The details of the results are shown in Table 2.2.
The second scenario considered is how much Hamming weights are needed since
more Hamming weights are not necessarily better. Not only can they overconstrain
the solver, and thus cause it to take longer to find a solution, inaccuracies in the
Hamming weights may also cause the solver to output wrong solutions. Since the
Hamming weights used are from the beginning and end of each round, there are a
total of 20 Hamming weights calculated from key scheduling and 17 Hamming weights
calculated from Twofish. In Table 2.3, the average time needed to solve partial key
is shown for when using all the Hamming weights from the key, only one Hamming
weight from the key, when using all the Hamming weights from the Twofish rounds,
when using only one Hamming weight from the Twofish round, and when using all
Hamming weights from both the key scheduling and Twofish round.
Table 2.3: Solving time (in seconds) based on Hamming weight (HW), given
plaintext/ciphertext.
Key solved All key HW 1 key HW All Twofish HW 1 Twofish HW All HW
1 word 184.96 75.78 89.46 20.38 51.08
2 word - - - - 959.71
3 word - - - - 3711.74
The scenarios are for when plaintext and ciphertext are given. As shown in Table
2.3, solving for 32 bit partial key (1 word) is much faster when only one Hamming
weight is used. Overall, solving for partial key is faster when using the Hamming
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weight for the Twofish round instead of the key scheduling. When we attempt to
solve for 64 bit and 96 bit partial key (2 word and 3 word respectively), the solver
is unable to output a solution within a reasonable amount of time. From this, we
can conclude that even if the key scheduling is precomputed, or even if we can only
calculate one Hamming weight from the Twofish algorithm, ASCA can still solve for
32 bit partial key. While less Hamming weights may allow the solver to find a solution
faster, as the amount of information that needs to be solved increases, more Hamming
weights may be needed.
It is worth keeping in mind that for ASCA on AES and other block ciphers,
the Hamming weights used are from all operations within the round. In Twofish,
however, different operations are performed on different sub-blocks at the same time,
so this experiment did not use Hamming weights from the operations within the
round, only Hamming weights from beginning and end of each round. For ASCA on
AES, 100 Hamming weights are used per round while for Twofish, only 16 Hamming
weights are used per round. If it is possible to isolate the power consumption and
extract Hamming weight from the operations within each round of Twofish, then the
performance of the attack will most likely improve.
2.6 TwoFish with CP Model
The ASCA attack proposed in this chapter so far uses the CNF model and a SAT
solver. In addition to incorporating different attacks or using multiple traces, the
attack may be optimized by using a more simplified model with different solvers.
The attack is traditionally performed with SAT solvers, which are used in verification
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and have NP complexity, so the functions are limited and the large set of equations
is difficult to keep track of. Other optimization techniques may prove to be more
efficient when used as solvers. For example, linear programming is polynomial time
soluble with continuous variables. It would also be interesting to see what results the
attack would produce with mixed integer programming, or constraint programming
with arbitrary constraints. In addition to more side-channel information and simpler
model, a more customized solver would be another interesting area to explore.
After implementing Twofish as psuedo-Boolean model with SAT solver, we then
tried ASCA on Twofish using a constraint programming (CP) solver [23]. The CP
solver allows a higher level of abstraction with byte variables instead, which simpli-
fies the model drastically. The two most difficult aspect of Twofish to represent as
CNF equations are the s-boxes and matrix multiplication. For CP solver, the matrix
multiplication can be modeled as normal byte-wise operations. The keyed s-boxes
consist of the functions q0 and q1, which separate the byte variables into nibbles and
performs operations and look up tables on them. Since the s-boxes no longer need to
be implemented as bit variables, all the operations within q0 and q1 shown in equation
2.2 can be represented as two look-up tables instead.
The operations for the S-box subround are shown in Figure 2.3 where the input of
the s-box subround can be expressed as the four bytes x0, x1, x2 and x3. The inputs
go through the functions q0 and q1 and are XORed with the s-box keys L1 and L0.
The output of the s-box, represented by y0, y1, y2 and y3 are the input to the MDS
matrix. By modeling q0 and q1 as lookup tables, the s-box step of each round can be
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Figure 2.3: S-box operation for Twofish-128 [45]
represented as follows:
y0 = q1[q0[q0[x0]⊕ l1,0]⊕ l0,0]
y1 = q0[q0[q1[x1]⊕ l1,1]⊕ l0,1]
y2 = q1[q1[q0[x2]⊕ l1,2]⊕ l0,2]
y3 = q0[q1[q1[x3]⊕ l1,3]⊕ l0,3]
(2.7)
The attack was performed on 10 random plaintext-key pairs with solving time
limit set to be 24 hours. Given 2 words of the key and Hamming weights for both
the algorithm and the key scheduling, we were able to solve for the other 2 words
within 5 minutes given plaintext and ciphertext, and within 60 minutes when given
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plaintext only. When solving for all 4 words of the key, however, the attack was only
able to finish within the time limit for 3 of the 10 plaintext-key pairs with average
solving time of 16 hours. While there was only a 30% success rate, the CP solver was
able to solve the Twofish equations that the SAT solver was unable to solve.
Table 2.4: Solving time (in seconds) based on Hamming weight (HW) using CP solver.
Key solved Plaintext/Ciphertext Plaintext
2 word 275.92 s 2954.3 s
4 word 16.2 hrs -
As shown in Table 2.4, we were able to solve for the complete key of Twofish
within the 24 hour time limit using a CP solver when given plaintext, ciphertext and
all the Hamming weights. Because of the fewer Hamming weights used in Twofish
vs. other algorithms such as AES, the success rate and performance are rather low.
2.7 Conclusion
For algebraic side-channel attack on Twofish, we express the Hamming weights and
the Twofish algorithm as a system of equations. The equations are then used as input
for the CrytoMiniSAT solver to solve for the key. While algebraic attack by itself is
not sufficient to break the algorithm, with the help of side-channel information such
as Hamming weights, we are able to correctly solve for 96-bits of the 128 bits key
in under 2 hours with known plaintext/ciphertext. While given both plaintext and
ciphertext as well as all the Hamming weights lead to overconstraints and cause a
slower solving time when solving for 32-bits of the key, more information is needed
to correctly solve for more bits of the key. For this attack, we assume the Hamming
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weights are known and correct, which may not always be the case due to noise.
However, we are able to deduce partial key with even one round of Hamming weight,
so the attack is achievable with real Hamming weight data even if we discard the
ones with more noise. It is also possible to introduce error variables for the Hamming
weight equations to account for any inaccuracy.
By using the CP solver, we were able to successfully perform ASCA on Twofish.
This experiment shows that the model and solver used greatly influences the success of
ASCA. However, the attack examined so far assumes perfect side-channel information.
In the next few chapters, we will examine the influence of the model and solver as
well as the practicality of the attack when taking possible side-channel errors into
account.
While ASCA is unable to solve for the full 128-bits key in less than 7 days, it is
able to solve for at least 96-bits of the key in less than 2 hours. In the future, we
can attempt to acquire the full 128 bits of the key by combining ASCA with other
attacks such as differential attacks or fault injection. Algebraic differential analysis
has been used to break reduced round DES before, where the differential analysis
information comes from analyzing the different plaintext/ciphertext pairs that use
the same key [12]. Differential algebraic cryptanalysis is also used to break reduced
round Serpent, which is another finalist of the AES competition [18]. ASCA has also
been combined with fault injection to recover the key to LED block cipher [59]. The
64-bit key is recovered within one minute on a common PC with a success rate of
79%. The ASCA fault injection attack is also successfully performed on GOST, a
block cipher where the S-boxes can be made known or unknown [60]. The attack on
Twofish is performed using Hamming weights from one trace, the performance may
also be improved if Hamming weights from multiple traces are used.
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The attack on solving for complete key of TwoFish was unsuccessful with the
psuedo-boolean model using SAT solver. Some of the random input-key pairs were
still running when the experiment was stopped after 7 days, so it is possible that it
ran out of time. The attack may be successful if given enough time or computational
power. However, the solver stopped running for a majority of the samples before the
7 days time limit. The amount of the variable and the size of the clauses for the model
are set before solving. While they greatly influence the solving time, they should not
cause the solver to be stuck during solving. One possibility for the unsuccessful attack
might be due to the conflict driven clause learning, CDCL, nature of the solver.
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Chapter 3
Influence of Error on Hamming
Weights for ASCA
3.1 Introduction
ASCA models the cryptographic algorithm and the side-channel information as a sys-
tem of equations. The equations are then put through a solver to solve for the secret
key. Since the attack targets the implementation of the cryptographic algorithm, even
the most mathematically secure algorithm may still be vulnerable to it. However, it
is still susceptible to error due to noise from SCA information, which may give inac-
curate solutions and increase the runtime. Depending on the size and complexity of
the model or equations, it may also have high memory consumption. Traditionally,
ASCA is performed with SAT solver. The biggest challenge when using SAT solver is
to model the problem as a set of Boolean equations. While this works well for simpler
algorithms, the model becomes more complicated with more complex algorithms and
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with error tolerance added. It is difficult to model the side-channel information with
error as SAT instances, and non-linear operations greatly increase the complexity of
the system.
3.1.1 Solvers
There are three paradigms of systematic solvers for problems that can be expressed
as decision variables and constraints: propositional satisfiability solving (SAT), con-
straint programming (CP) and integer programming (IP). SAT solvers uses unit prop-
agation and clause learning to prune search space and uses heuristics and learned
clauses to perform non-chronological backtracking. CP uses constraint propagation
to prune search spaces and heuristics to guide search. IP relies on linear program-
ming relaxation and branch-and-cut to find optimal integer solutions. SAT is suited
to problems that are intrinsically Boolean. CP is suited to problems for which global
constraints, symmetry breaking and problem-specific propagation and labeling can
be exploited. IP is more suited to problems that can be naturally expressed with
disequality constraints. Using the right model with the right solver can drastically
improve efficiency [62]. Constraint programming provides languages and libraries that
allows the customization of the search algorithms, which allows us to better express
the algebraic model for more complex algorithms and for error tolerance. The con-
straints can be logical, deductive or algorithmic. The problem can also be defined
as arbitrary Boolean combinations of constraints instead of strictly conjunction in
SAT. For CP, the performance of the solver can be greatly improved with good use
of global constraints and other modeling choices [4].
Instead of SAT, [33] models the equations as a non-linear pseudo-boolean opti-
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mization problem with error taken into account and is able to successfully perform
the attack on Keeloq. The solver is able to find the key with 18.8% error and an
average of 3.8 hrs in runtime. Another attack in [35] uses the constraint solver SCIP-
spx to choose the most likely intermediate state instead of the most likely key. Since
the information has some redundancy, it can tolerate a lower level of accuracy in the
recovery of individual state elements. This gives the correct key 100% of the time.
The median for successful attack is 607 seconds and the maximum is 6 hours. Inspired
by that, we explored using bit-vectors with a CP solver instead of Boolean equations
with SAT solver. The complexity of the equation set for the cryptographic algorithm
is greatly reduced, thus improving the runtime. Even if there are multiple solutions
that satisfy the model, other solvers can only output one solution, which may or may
not be correct while we use an Objective-C solver that outputs all possible solutions.
The CP approach delivers orders of magnitude improvement in run time and memory
usage for ASCA[23]. Since the attack is no longer as disadvantageous due to memory
and runtime as before, this allows us to explore the attack in more details.
In the previous chapters, we explored the attack in the data collection and al-
gorithm stage. In this chapter, we examine the side-channel information needed for
the attack. More specifically, the effect of Hamming weight error on ASCA and the
impact of side-channel information from subrounds of the AES algorithm. We eval-
uate the tolerance of the model regarding the side-channel information, and how the
information from different subrounds affects the performance of the attack. Not only
will this give us a better understanding of the attack and let us know where error
matters, it may also provide insights to what’s most important to protect and help
with future countermeasures.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides an overview of
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the Tolerant Algebraic Side-Channel Analysis (TASCA) attack. Section 3.3 provides
a brief overview of the attack model. Section 3.4 explains the experimental setup for
our implementation of the attack. Section 3.5 describes the experiments and results.
Finally, Section 3.6 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Tolerant Algebraic Side-Channel Analysis
The attack performed in this chapter is error tolerant ASCA. In order to experiment
with error range and concentration, we are using simulated data instead of real power
traces for the attack. For each pair of plaintext and key, a set of Hamming weights are
generated. Typically, the formal description of the AES-128 algorithm, the generated
Hamming weights and error from the side-channel information are represented as a
system of Boolean equations and a SAT solver is used to solve for the key.
The AES algorithm as well as side-channel information are written using bit-
vectors with a constraint programming (CP) model [30]. The CP model discussed
here was developed in collaboration with F. Liu, W. Cruz, G. Johnson and L. Michel
[23]. SAT solvers are rather simple and rigid. When multiple solutions are possible,
the non-optimizing SAT solver arbitrarily chooses an solution and terminates, thus
the success of the attack is still dependent on the error rate rather than the set size.
CP model transforms it from a satisfiability problem to an optimization problem. Bit-
vector variables can be viewed as a sequence of binary variables. The primary purpose
of bit-vector variables is to reason about which bits in the vector are fixed. The bit-
vector implementation uses bit operations of the underlying architecture, avoiding
the drawback of a bit-blasting approach that associates a variable with each bit.
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With this, we can adopt a more direct and natural formulation that does not require
linearizations. The new model drastically increases the probability of successfully
recovering the key.
3.3 Attack Model
AES is one of the most widely used and commonly studied block ciphers. The varia-
tion studied in this chapter is AES-128. It takes blocks of 128 bits as input (plaintext),
arranges it into a state of 4 by 4 bytes, then combines it with a secret key. The output
goes through 10 rounds of operations to produce the final ciphertext as illustrated in
Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: AES-128.
Except for the last round, each round of AES consists of four subrounds, SubByte,
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ShiftRow, MixColumn and AddRoundKey as illustrated in Figure 3.2. For more
details on the structure of AES, please refer to [10].
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Figure 3.2: The four subrounds of AES.
The attack is modeled as a Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP). It is a tuple
〈X,D,C〉 where X is a finite set of variables, C is a set of constraints and D is a set
of domains for the variables, i.e., ∀x ∈ X, D(x) denotes the domain of variable x.
3.3.1 Domains
A bit-vector domain is a pair of 〈l, u〉 of bit-vectors such that li < ui(0 ≤ i < k). The
bit-vector domain represents the set of bit-vectors
{b|l ≤ b ≤ u ∧ ∀i ∈ 0..k − 1 : li = ui ⇒ bi = li}
Let D be a bit-vector domain. The domain of bit i in D, denoted by Di, is the
set {bi|b ∈ D}.
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3.3.2 Variables
For the Pseudo-Boolean model, a byte would be represented by 8 Boolean variables.
In the CP model, it is represented by a single bit-vector Ssr,i ∈ 0, 18. Each state
variable is represented by 16 bit-vectors that are 8-bit wide. All AES subround
transformations operate over 8-bit values. Therefore, 8-bit wide bit-vectors are used
for this model. The side-channel information and the state of the AES algorithm are
modeled as decision variables below:
• State variables Ssr,i,j corresponds to each intermediate state. Ssr,i,j denotes
the value of bit j of state byte i at subround sr, where sr ∈ [0, 40], i ∈ [0, 15],
j ∈ [0, 7]. S0 represents the initial plaintext and S40 represents the ciphertext.
• Key variables Kr,i,j corresponds to the 128-bit key. Kr,i,j denotes the value
of bit j of key byte i at round r, where r ∈ [0, 10], i ∈ [0, 15], j ∈ [0, 7]. K0
refers to the cipher key and Kr (r > 0) refers to the round keys derived from
the cipher key via key expansion.
• Error variables Esr,i relaxes the SCA constraints to account for noise in side-
channel equations. The actual value of a state variable is allowed to deviate from
the measured value by ±1 for the initial experiment and ±2 for the subsequent
experiment to cover a more realistic range of errors. The variable Esr,0 denotes
the positive error and the variable Esr,1 denotes the negative error.
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3.3.3 Constraints
The bit-vector library used supports constraints for arithmetic, relational, logical and
structural bit-vector manipulations. A generalization of the element constraint over
bit-vector arrays and a count constraint to determine the Hamming weight are also
used for this attack model. The constraints for the AES subround operations and
side channel information are presented below:
• AddKey/AddRoundKey XOR the state with the round key, which is derived
from the secret key via key expansion. It is implemented as a bitwise XOR
operation between two input bit-vectors. Each byte of the state is represented
by the constraint:
Ssr,i ⊕Ksr,i = Ssr+1,i,∀i = {0, ..., 15}
• SubByte substitutes each byte of the state with another byte according to
a look-up table or S-box. It is implemented as an element constraint over
bit-vectors. The SubByte constraint models the permutation pi with a single
element constraint over bit-vectors:
SBox[A] = B
• ShiftRows & MixColumns shifts each of the four rows of the state 0, 1, 2, and
3 bytes to the left then multiplies each column with a matrix of constants (MC).
The two operations are combined together and the 8-bit efficient MixColumns
implementation is used in the CP encoding. Bit-vector constraints are used to
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capture XOR as well as xtime resulting in the following for each column:
βk = xtime(ak ⊕ a(k+1)%4) ∀ k ∈ 0..3
ok =
(
3⊕
i=0
ai
)
⊕ βk ⊕ ak ∀ k ∈ 0..3
• Key Expansion is responsible for generating the round keys used during Ad-
dRoundKey from the cipher key. A set of bit-vectors variables representing
round constants rconi are created for each round. The SubByte and XOR con-
straints are used to generate the round keys. The following is the encoding for
the Key Expansion:
Kr,0 = SubByte(Kr−1,13)⊕Kr−1,0 ⊕RCr
Kr,1 = Kr−1,1 ⊕ SubByte(Kr−1,14)
Kr,2 = Kr−1,2 ⊕ SubByte(Kr−1,15)
Kr,3 = Kr−1,3 ⊕ SubByte(Kr−1,12)
Kr,i+4 = Kr,i ⊕Kr−1,i+4,∀i = {0, ..., 11}
• Side-Channel Constraints are created from the Hamming weight vector. The
count constraint counts the number of bits with the value of 1 in a bit-vector
and represents the actual Hamming weights. The constraint Msr,i is represented
as Hamming weights with errors included:
count(Ssr,i) + e
+
sr,i − e−sr,i = Msr,i
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• Objective Function is modeled as the total number of errors, same as the IP
model:
Min :
∑
e+sr,i +
∑
e−sr,i
In addition to providing a set of Hamming weights (HW) to account for errors,
TASCA goes a step further and picks the most likely HW to branch/search first as
part of the goal function.
3.3.4 Search
Aside from the equations representing AES and the Hamming weights, a big part of
the CP version of the TASCA model is the search, which optimizes the error from the
Hamming weights. A Hamming weight is generated as the side-channel information
for each byte of the state during AES encryption. A candidate value v ∈ D(Sr,i) has
a Hamming weight H(v) =
∑
b∈0..7(v|b = 1) capturing the number of bits at 1 in v.
TASCA imposes that D(Sr,i) be restricted to values v for which
−1 ≤ H(v)−Mr,i ≤ 1
i.e., the discrepancy between the measurement Mr,i and the value v does not exceed
±1. The goal of the CP model is to minimize the total number of errors that may
be observed for the Hamming weights. Branching on value assignments that yield
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the least amount of errors in the objective will be most effective to get high-quality
solutions early on. With the objective equal to the sum of the errors, we have
min
41∑
j=0
E(j, σ(Sj)) where E(j, v) =

0 if H(v) = Mj
1 if H(v) = Mj ± 1
and σ is the current value assignment.
Figure 3.3: Circuit for bytes {0, 1, 2, 3}.
A Circuit View: Considering a single round of the AES algorithm containing
all 4 subrounds, AddRoundKey, SubBytes, and MixColumns/ShiftRows, Figure 3.3
illustrates the subrounds for the first column of the state matrix. The structure is
repeated four times for the entire state. The column [S0,0S0,5S0,10S0,15]
T of the state
and the column [K0,0K0,5K0,10K0,15]
T of the sub-round key form the inputs at the
bottom of the Figure. In round 1, [S0,0S0,5S0,10S0,15]
T are known since they represent
bytes of the plaintext. AddRoundKey and SubBytes apply bijective transformations
once the state is known. Consequently, as soon as S2,0, S1,0 or K0,0 is fixed, the others
are fixed by propagation (This is also true for S2,5, S1,5 and K0,5). The dashed box
on the left that contains S2,0 and S2,5 highlights the inputs to an exclusive OR that
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yields the temporary value TM0. The output of the circuit TM
′
0 is the first byte of
the output, i.e., state S4,0. The vertical light-gray column on the left is a description
of the relations defining byte 0 of the output. The evaluation of TM0 rests upon the
availability of values for both S2,0 and S2,5. Observe that if, for instance, S2,5 is fixed,
one only needs to fix S2,10 to get propagation up and down and fix both K0,10 and
TM ′1.
Variable Selection Heuristic: Branching on TM0 will only trigger propaga-
tion “up” as the exclusive OR will not be able to push information “down”. Similarly,
branching on S2,0 or even K0,0 will have a limited propagation given the bijective
nature of the relations in the bottom “legs”. However, simultaneously assigning both
variables in the dashed box will trigger propagation up and down.
This is a key insight into the variable selection strategy. The search should branch
on pairs of variables that trigger propagation within an entire gray box. In Figure 3.3
this implies four columns for a total of 16 pairs of variables to consider for the first
branching decision (recall that this structure is replicated 4 times). The four columns
are topped by TM ′0, TM
′
1, TM
′
2 and TM
′
3. Once a pair is selected, the search should
create another pair by reusing one of the two variables from the first pair. For
instance, if 〈S2,0, S2,5〉 is selected, it is tempting to consider the two pairs 〈S2,5, S2,10〉
and 〈S2,15, S2,0〉 as the domains of TM1 and TM3 are reduced by the first choice.
Finally, observe that not all pairs of values drawn from the domains of S2,0 and S2,5
are compatible. Some of these pairs may induce errors that exceed the ±1 margin
dictated by TASCA. It is therefore advisable to follow the first-fail and break ties
among pairs of variables based on the number of pairs of values that yield assignments
60
compatible with the error margins.
Value Selection Heuristic: The errors in the objective are driven by the sum
of measurement errors on state variables. If the search considers a pair of values
〈a, b〉 ∈ D(S2,0)×D(S2,5)
it can assess the impact that the simultaneous assignments S2,0 = a ∧ S2,5 = b would
have on the errors at the state variables in the leftmost gray column. This assessment
is an under-approximation of the true error induced by the assignments. Indeed TM ′1
can expose errors caused by the choice of value b for S2,5, but that falls outside the
gray column and is therefore ignored. A sensible value selection heuristic considers
pairs of values and assesses their quality with a scoring function C. Given a pair of
values 〈a, b〉, the scoring is
C(〈a, b〉) = Cleg(a, [S2,0, S1,0, K0,0]) + Cleg(b, [S2,5, S1,5, K0,5]) + Cmc(a⊕ b, [TM ′0])
The functions Cleg and Cmc model the errors attributable to a leg in the gray box,
or the top of a gray box (the MixColumns operation) and a ⊕ b denotes the value
inferred for TM0 based on the connecting XOR constraint. Cleg and Cmc measure the
differences between the value of the state variable and the expected Hamming weight.
Given a pair of variables and the scoring function C, the value heuristic enumerates
pairs that contribute the least to the objective function.
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Optimality Pruning: Since the total contribution of errors due to Hamming
weights accumulates as the search dives deeper, the total error can be used to further
prune value-pairs whose contribution would bring the total beyond the total error for
the incumbent solution.
3.4 Error Tolerance Analysis
With the optimized model of AES, we decided to explore the influence of error from
different subrounds and the error tolerance on the success and solving time of the
attack.
3.4.1 Subround Comparison
Previous results from [37] have shown that if the leak count is reduced to less than a
full round, the probability of success becomes vanishingly small. While [43] mentions
that Hamming weights from MixColumn seem to be the most critical when solving the
system, there have been no experiments done to explore the influence of side-channel
information from different subrounds on the attack. One advantage of TASCA is
the minimal data needed - only 1 round of Hamming weights from 1 trace in error-
free situations. If the Hamming weights from certain subrounds are more important
than others, then whether the attack will succeed when using less than 1 round of
Hamming weights will also depend on which Hamming weights are left out. Since
TASCA takes into account the amount of error, we can observe the effect of different
subrounds on the success of the attack by introducing error on specific subround.
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3.4.2 Error Tolerance
It has been demonstrated in [43] that side-channel information such as Hamming
weight can be acquired with 80% accuracy from 1 power trace by using error detec-
tion (rejecting side-channel information that gives rise to incoherent input/output
values for the S-boxes) and likelihood rating (only using a subset of all the Ham-
ming weights extracted with the templates, starting with the most likely ones). Most
ASCA assumes that the distance of an erroneous Hamming weight to the correct
Hamming weight is only +/-1. This assumption on the error restricts the practical
use since errors of +/-2 are possible depending on the noise level of the device.
IASCA in [31] explores the error tolerance of the Hamming weight by examin-
ing the distribution from 2000 attack traces extracted from AES-128 implemented
on an ATMega 2561 microcontroller with an 8-bit register. The distribution of er-
ror is illustrated in Table 3.1. The severity of an error, or the range of Hamming
weights assumed, is separated into five error classes ez where z denotes the number
of additional consecutive Hamming weights. Error variable e0 to e4 denotes the set
of Hamming weights with 0 to 4 errors. For all error classes, it is assumed that the
correct Hamming weight is within the set. The error class e0 contains only the cor-
rect Hamming weight (HW). The error class e1 is a set of two consecutive Hamming
weights with one correct and one erroneous (HW, HW+1) or (HW-1, HW). The error
class e2 is a set of three Hamming weights that contains the correct Hamming weight
and two erroneous Hamming weights (HW-1, HW, HW+1), (HW-2, HW-1, HW)
or (HW, HW+1, HW+2). The error class e3 is a set of four consecutive Hamming
weights, three of which are erroneous. And the error class e4 contains five consecutive
Hamming weights, four of which are erroneous.
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Table 3.1: Error distribution from [31].
Error Class e0 e1 e2 e3 e4
Occurrence 28% 44% 24% 4% 0%
The template attack was able to predict the correct Hamming weight in 28% of
all corresponding values. Moreover, the error is not restricted to only +/-1 as often
considered when modeling TASCA. In [23], it was shown that the CP solver allows us
to solve for 16 bytes of the key, on average, in under 10 seconds for random instances
and in under 80 seconds for structured instances. For this chapter we expand the
error range from +/-1 to +/-2 to cover all error classes.
3.5 Results
We assume that the key expansion is done in advance and no leaks from the process
are available. This corresponds to a more challenging scenario since it is shown in
[27] that side-channel leakages from an 8-bit microcontroller implementation of AES
during key expansion are sufficient to recover the complete key. Thus the attack will
focus on the AES algorithm itself. Our analysis considers a simulated implementation
of AES-128 in 8-bit microcontroller as device under test (DUT). For our attack,
TASCA with CP model, the solver used in the experiments is Objective-CP [23].
The experiments runs on Mac with macOS Sierra 10.12.6, 3.1 GHz Intel Core
i5 processor and 8GB memory. For random instances, the plaintexts are chosen
uniformly in {0, 1}128 and the cipher keys are fixed. Each instance contains a known
plaintext and 100 Hamming weights that correspond to the first round of AES.
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3.5.1 Effect of Subrounds
The first experiment tests the effect of different subrounds on the success of the
attack. The test is done on 10 randomly generated instances given the Hamming
weights for the first round. There are a total of 16 bytes of Hamming weights for
AddRoundKey, 16 bytes for SubByte, no Hamming weights for ShiftRow and 36
bytes for MixColumn. To isolate the influence of different subrounds on the attack,
we randomly introduces +/-1 error on the 16 bytes of Hamming weights for AddKey,
SubByte or MixColumn only while keeping the rest of the subrounds error free. We
then compared the runtime, solution pool and success rate to see how the errors in
different subrounds affect the success of the attack. Table 3.2 shows the average
solving time, the solution pool (number of solutions that satisfies the model), and the
success rate (how many instances solved for the key within 24 hours).
Table 3.2: Influence of Hamming weights for subrounds on TASCA.
Subround with +/-1 error AddRoundKey SubByte MixColumn
Solving time 3,609.93s 1,871.72s 940.02s
Solution pool 8,470 39,323 1,217
Success rate 80% 80% 60%
One unique aspect of our solver is that it outputs all possible solutions, so there
are no wrong solutions unlike other solvers which only picks one solution as the final
result when multiple solutions are possible. It either finds no solution (solution pool
of 0), one solution (the correct solution) or a set of possible solutions that includes
the correct solution. [37] has shown that it only takes seconds to loop through set
of solutions and finds the correct key, so the difference between the size of solution
pool is not as important as the solving time and success rate. This experiment shows
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that the attack is more difficult, or has a lower success rate, when all the errors are
concentrated on information from MixColumn than on AddRoundKey and SubByte.
This may be due to the fact that MixColumn is the most complicated subround.
However, out of the random instances that are solvable for the key within 24 hours,
MixColumn is the fastest followed by SubByte, then AddRoundKey. This may be due
to the fact that MixColumn is the subround with the larger set of Hamming weights,
so even with 16 errors introduced there are still 20 correct Hamming weights. The
Hamming weights from AddRoundKey are directly correlated to the key bytes the
attack is trying to solve, so errors or larger set of possible Hamming weight values in
AddRoundKey causes a much longer solving time than for other subrounds.
3.5.2 Wider Error Tolerance
Most error tolerant ASCA from previous works, such as [61], minimize error by using
multiple traces and only model the Hamming weights with errors of +/-1, or up to
error class e2. However, this range cannot cover the complete range of Hamming
weight errors in some cases. Expanding the error tolerance to e3 or even e4, may
allow the attack to succeed with single trace or even with noisy measurements. Since
TASCA-CP model delivers orders of magnitude improvement in runtime and memory
usage for error class of up to e2, [23], this chapter extends the model to cover error
class of e3 and e4 for a more practical attack. While we originally intended to run the
code with 100% error rate, such a constraint negates the effect of the search function
and the solver is unable to arrive at solutions within the 10 hour time limit. Since it is
possible to acquire Hamming weights with 80% accuracy with some data processing
[43], we attempt an error rate of 20% instead, where 20% of the Hamming weights are
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assigned an error of -1, +1, -2 or +2. The attack is performed on 10 instances using
only Hamming weights from the first round. All attacks are performed with known
plaintext/ciphertext. The error rate refers to the percentage of Hamming weights
with error. The success rate refers to the percentage of instances that outputs the
correct key within a reasonable amount of time. The Hamming weight models with
error class of e3 and e4 are also explored in [34], [31] and [48]. Table 3.3 provides a
comparison of our results with other papers for ASCA with error tolerance beyond
+/-1 (e2).
Table 3.3: Attack comparison.
Error
Rate
Error
Class
Average Solving
Time
Success
Rate
Round Traces
TASCA [34] 20% e3 1332.07s 72.7% R1 1
IASCA [31] 100% e3 84s 100% R1-R3 1
IASCA [31] 100% e4 100s 50% R1 1
ETASCA [48] 100% e4 33.29s - R1 3
TASCA-CP 20% e4 8.6hrs 50% R1 1
Since different papers set different limits for the parameters of their experiments,
the comparison provided in Table 3.3 is not equivalent. For our experiment, if it
cannot produce solution within 10 hours, it counts as a fail. However, the time limit
for other experiments range from 1 hour to 24 hours. To explore the limit of the
model and the solver, we used error range of +/-2 for e4 while other papers such
as IASCA used a mixture of the correct Hamming weight, HW +/-1 and HW +/-2.
Moreover, our experiment only used one trace from one round with error range of
+/-2 while the other experiment used multiple traces, multiple rounds or a smaller
error range.
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The runtime and success rate of our model and solver performed magnitudes better
than other models and solver for Hamming weight range of +/-1. This is partially due
to the simplicity of how the equations and variables are expressed in the model, and
partially due to the allowance for customization provided by the Objective-CP solver
we are using. The solvers used in other papers takes the set of equations as input
and do not have the ability to allow customization of the solver or search algorithm.
When the model was revised to expand the range of Hamming weight errors from
+/-1 to +/-2, no further modification to the search algorithm was made except the
expansion of the range for the variable and value pairing. Comparing the results
between TASCA for Hamming weight range of +/-1 to Hamming weight range of
+/-2, the performance drastically decreased. This shows that while the bit-vector
equation and CP models allow a simpler and easier expression of the algorithm, the
improvement in performance of our TASCA over others for Hamming weight range of
+/-1 is largely due to customization of the solver, or the optimization provided by the
search algorithm. The performance can be optimized by using more elaborate search
methods over more rounds or multiple traces. Due to complexity, we did not have
time to further experiment with different search algorithms, which would be worth
examining in a future work.
3.6 Conclusions
The results show that the side-channel information from some subrounds are indeed
more influential than others for a successful attack. While accurate information from
MixColumn is most important for a higher chance of success for TASCA, the instances
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with erroneous SubByte run faster than those with erroneous AddRoundKey. This
information is useful for the attacker when given multiple traces with different errors,
since choosing a trace or a round of Hamming weight with less error in the MixColumn
subround may give a higher chance of successful attack. This experiment also provides
a basis to help improve countermeasures for TASCA. Since current countermeasures,
such as random masking, are very time consuming, it may be better to focus on
masking side-channel information on specific subround instead. The fast runtime
of TASCA in our case is strongly dependent on the search algorithm, which filters
out less probable Hamming weights and errors by looking at the correlation of error
between Hamming weights of different subrounds. Thus, when the error range is
expand to +/-2 for Hamming weights, the search algorithm needs to be changed and
the runtime drastically increased.
The most important points that define a successful attack are that it should run
fast, use less data/information with lax requirements, and have a high success rate.
A better error tolerance gives a better chance of attack succeeding even with lower
quality data. However, the difference in results may be due to the different solver
and model used in the attack rather than an indication of security or robustness of
the cryptographic algorithm itself.
To prevent ASCA, either the algebraic complexity of the cryptographic algorithm
needs to be increased, or countermeasures should be implemented to make it more
difficult to collect accurate SCA. There are many countermeasures in existence, some
of which are currently present in industry solutions. However, the performance of
such solutions leaves room for improvement. The countermeasures only minimizes
the probability of success for ASCA but does not eliminate it, since all devices and
implementations will inevitably emit some sort of side-channel leakage, however small
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the traces are.
3.6.1 Possible Improvements
In addition to what’s presented in this chapter, we can also test error tolerant ASCA
for unknown plaintext/ciphertext. No other ASCA with error tolerance has been suc-
cessful with unknown plaintext/ciphertext, and yet, that is one of the big advantage
of TASCA over SCA.
While the attack can be further improved with customized search algorithm, dif-
ferent models and different solvers, we should also explore other ways to optimize the
attack. The performance for using Hamming weights from different rounds instead
of the first round was not as good, most likely due to the extra information and
overhead from longer search path when backtracking. However, the results may differ
with a different profiling methods or leakage models. Aside from Hamming weights,
vectors of probability is proposed as a better way to present side-channel informa-
tion. Because we are using a more raw form of the data representing the power trace
instead of distilling it down to a value per byte, the loss of data from the power traces
collected is minimized.
It would also be interesting to examine the performance of the attack if performed
on AES-256 or other modes of AES such as ECB or CBC. Since SCA countermeasures
such as random masking are starting to become common among devices, it would be
worthwhile to attempt the attack on a masked version. When attacking a masked
algorithm, the attacker requires knowledge of the exact point of Hamming weights
in the power trace that correlates with the intermediate value as well as the type of
masking used. Aside from being an additional requirement, this complicates equations
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used in the model for the attack and adds another set of unknown variables that needs
to be taken into account for the solver.
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Chapter 4
Feasibility of ASCA on FPGA
4.1 Introduction
Traditionally, ASICs or more specifically microcontrollers are the common compo-
nents in the design of embedded systems. However, FPGAs are becoming integral
parts of embedded systems nowadays, especially when it comes to cryptographic
applications. A majority of modern security protocols such as SSL are algorithm
independent and allow for multiple encryption algorithms. While algorithm agility is
costly with traditional hardware, FPGAs can be reprogrammed on-the-fly. For any
update or changes, such as when DES expired or when AES was created, FPGA-
equipped encryption devices can connect to a network and upload the new code
immediately while upgrade of ASIC-implemented algorithms are infeasible if many
devices are affected or if the systems are not easily accessible [57]. Because FPGA
based designs follow a relatively simple design process and the hardware is already
available, it has a faster ”time-to-market”. Compared to a full custom ASIC design,
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FPGAs are also cost efficient and easier to manage. Compared to software solutions,
FPGAs have lower power consumption and a higher data throughput.
With wide-spread usage of FPGAs, implementation security becomes an increas-
ing concern. One of the major security concerns for implementation are side channel
attacks (SCA). FPGAs are implemented with CMOS circuits, where the switching of
the gates causes a current flow that is observable. While most side-channel attacks
have been based on 8-bit micro-controllers, side-channel information such as power
consumption of the encryption can be acquired and used to attack most devices that
use CMOS circuits. In fact, power analysis attacks has been successfully performed
on AES implemented on FPGA [50], ASIC [38], STC89C52 Microprocessor [13], and
Cortex-M3 CPU [2].
Since ASCA uses information from power consumption, it should be feasible for
any platform or algorithm where power analysis attack is successful as well with fewer
traces required from the target. However, most of the studies done on ASCA are
either based on simulated data or traces collected from 8-bit microcontrollers. The
success of ASCA depends on the complexity of the algorithm being modeled, but
more importantly, the amount and accuracy of the side-channel information. In this
chapter, we explore the application and feasibility of ASCA on different platforms,
such as FPGA and examine the error model of Hamming weights in terms of success
of the attack.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 explains previous re-
search done on related attacks on FPGA as well as countermeasures. Section 4.3
describes how the attack is performed, focusing on the method to extract Hamming
weights from the power consumption traces. Section 4.4 describes the experiments
performed for data extraction. Section 4.5 analyzes the attack and section 4.6 con-
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cludes the chapter.
4.2 Background
Any physical implementation of a cryptographic system might provide side channel
leakage that reveals unwanted information. Power consumption can be acquired as
side-channel information and used to attack most devices that use CMOS circuits.
The first successful power analysis attack on FPGA was done by [39] targeting an
elliptic curve cryptographic processor. They confirmed that the amount of power
consumed is linear to the number of switched flip-flops. A power analysis attack was
also successfully performed on DES and RSA for FPGA [51, 52]. A power analysis
attack on the Xilinx Spartan-2 FPGA implementation of AES was successful after
using traces from 300 plaintexts [50, 49]. On a slightly parallel track, a generalized
square attack was performed on an FPGA implementation of AES using electromag-
netic side-channel information. For a set of states where passive bytes keep the same
value for each state and active bytes are different from one state to another, a square
attack tracks the evolution of the set through the rounds. Seven thousand traces were
collected on an FPGA at 50 MHz. The acquisition of the signals can be made in less
than two hours depending on the condition and the according statistcal treaments
can be made in less than a week [6].
The majority of the proposed countermeasures deals with software such as al-
gorithmic changes by masking the secret keys with random values. There are also
hardware countermeasures, which often deal with some form of power trace smoothing
or with transistor-level changes of logic. These countermeasures reduce the amount
74
and magnitude of side-channel leakage but do not fundamentally prevent the attack,
and they often come with high overhead. The most recent countermeasure imple-
mented on FPGA using Dynamic Differential Logic still has a 50% increase in time
delay and 90% increase in slice utilization compared with a normal non-secure single
ended implementation [55].
While the performance of ASCA depends on the model and solver used, the success
of ASCA mostly depends on the amount and accuracy of the side-channel informa-
tion. The inaccuracy of the side-channel information from 8-bit microcontroller has
been explored in [31, 61, 35] and there are many ways to make the attack more error
tolerant, as explained in Chapter 3. This chapter explores the feasibility and perfor-
mance of the attack on FPGA. While ASCA has been successfully performed based
on data from 8-bit microcontroller and on simulated data, it has not been attempted
on other devices such as FPGA.
Past research for power analysis attacks has shown that there is indeed a dif-
ference in the amount of data required when using simulated data vs. real power
traces, [54, 38, 15]. Thus, it is important to test the effectiveness of TASCA on real
data. The variations in the power consumption trace captured are mostly due to
dynamic power consumption in the FPGAs, which depends mostly on the amount
of resources used. Past research done in [47] has shown that 60% of the power con-
sumption in a Xilinx Virtex-II FPGA is due to the interconnects, 14% due to clocking
and 15% due to logic. In general, it is more difficult to attack hardware FPGA de-
signs since parallel logic execution causes a dilution of the attacks’ signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) and increases the difficulty of isolating the power consumption for the
encryption/decryption process. High work frequencies can also make the sampling
process critical since the FPGA can process multiple operations per clock period. In
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addition to differences in implementation, the results are also highly dependent on
the measurement capabilities such as the oscilloscope and probes used. While pure
side channel attacks can minimize the influence of noise with larger quantity of data,
the advantage and key point of ASCA is the minimal amount of power traces from
the target device used in the attack. Thus, ASCA may not be practical or feasible
for more complex cryptographic algorithms or different platforms despite the success
it achieved with AES on 8-bit microcontrollers.
For ASCA, we first extract the Hamming weights from the power consumption
data during encryption on an FPGA, then use that in our error tolerant ASCA model
to solve for the key. For traditional template attack, noise in the data can be reduced
and the accuracy increased by utilizing different statistical analysis technique and
using multiple target traces. Since we are using template attack to extract Hamming
weights instead of the key for ASCA, some of the improvements cannot be used
and the attack only uses one target trace at a time. In this chapter, we evaluate
the feasibility of the attack as well as the error model for the attack on AES-128
implemented on FPGA.
4.3 Attack Model
The TASCA attack assumes the attacker has access to a Device Under Test (DUT)
that is identical to the target of the attack and emits a measurable side-channel
leakage, such as power consumption, during encryption or decryption. The power
consumption should be capturable with an oscilloscope with an error rate that the
solver can handle. The TASCA methodology recovers the secret key from the power
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trace and consists of three main phases:
• Extracting side-channel information. The side-channel information, or
Hamming weight values of the intermediate variables, is extracted from the
leakages.
• Model the algorithm and side-channel information as set of algebraic
equations. The formal description of the algorithm, AES-128, the Hamming
weights from the side-channel information as well as error variables are repre-
sented as a system of equations.
• Solve for the secret key. Given the model and the plaintext, the solver finds
the solution that satisfies the system of equations. This solution should be the
correct secret key.
The objective of the attack is to acquire the key with a high success rate using
the least amount of information and in a reasonable amount of time. This chapter
focuses on extracting the side-channel information from the power traces of the DUT
during encryption or decryption. This is done using template attack, where the
attacker creates a template of the power traces from the DUT then match the power
trace from the target with the template created to find the most likely value for the
side-channel information.
4.3.1 Template Data
For this chapter, we use power traces collected from the SASEBO-GII board in DPA
Contest v2. The SASEBO-GII is a board designed and developed in response to the
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need for standardizing security evaluation against side-channel attacks. It contains
a cryptographic FPGA (Xilinx Virtex-5 LX30/50) where the target algorithm is lo-
cated and performs the encryption. The board also contains a control FPGA (Xilinx
Spartan-3A) responsible for configurations and data communication with a clock sig-
nal of 24MHz. A USB connection to the PC provides the board with a stable 5V of
power and programs the FPGAs using the flash ROM. The algorithm and param-
eters are written in verilog and programmed onto the FPGAs using Microsoft .Net
Framework 3.5 and Xilinx ISE WebPACK.
Figure 4.1: SASEBO-GII board, top view.
Because the traces collected by different laboratories are different due to differ-
ences in acquisition platform sensitivity, cryptographic algorithm implementation,
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board noise and such, the DPA contest is an initiative towards an international bench-
marking reference so the researchers can compare results in an objective manner. The
contests provide a variety of power traces to be used in SCA experiments. DPA con-
test v1 provides power consumption traces for ASIC implementation of DES. DPA
contest v2 provides power consumption traces for FPGA implementation of AES.
DPA contest v3 is an acquisition contest to collect the best traces using techniques
and tools of participants’ choice, given the same AES design loaded on the SASEBO-
GII board. DPA contest v4 provides power consumption traces of protected software
implementation of AES. The data collected in DPA contest v2 are from AES-128 im-
plemented on a SASEBO-GII board. The AES module performs one round of AES
per clock cycle. The template campaign data we are using includes 1,000,000 traces
of complete implementation of AES-128. It contains 50 different keys with 20,000
random plaintext for each key.
The target algorithm in this chapter is the symmetric block cipher AES-128. It
takes blocks of 128 bits as input (plaintext), arranges it into a state of 4 by 4 bytes,
and then combines it with a secret key. The output goes through 10 rounds of
operations to produce the final ciphertext. Because the power consumption of the
FPGA correlates with the data and operations being processed, the pattern for the
10 rounds of AES-128 can be seen in the power consumption collected, as shown in
4.2.
For the template attack, the attacker must first collect a large number of power
traces from a copy of the target DUT for each possible value of the target variables.
The information extracted are Hamming weights so there are 9 possible values for
each byte of the intermediate value. The Hamming weight values are calculated for
each plaintext/key pair and the corresponding power trace is then put into one of
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Figure 4.2: A power trace of AES-128 from DPA Contest v2 on a SASEBO-GII board.
the 9 categories of Hamming weight. We used 20,000 power traces from the data
set and focus on the power traces from first round of AES-128. All processing and
statistical analysis involved in the attack assumes that the power trace follows a
normal (Gaussian) distribution. If the sample data has a normal distribution, then
the data appears along the reference line in a normal probability plot. Curvatures
in the plot would indicate distributions other than normal. As shown in the normal
probability plot and histogram of the FPGA data, shown in Figure 4.3, the power
traces used has a Gaussian distribution. Since we are working with multiple variables,
the templates created use multivariate Gaussian model.
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of AES power traces from FPGA.
4.3.2 Points of Interest
To create the template, we need to create a multivariate probability describing the
power traces for every possible Hamming weight. The use of multivariate noise statis-
tics is key to extracting the maximum information from a single sample. However,
if we modeled the entire power trace this way, each of which contains 3000 samples,
then we would need a 3000-dimension distribution. This is time consuming and un-
necessary since not all samples are related to the Hamming weight. Instead, it is
more efficient to choose a few points of interest that vary strongly between different
categories to use as template. This will significantly reduce the processing overhead
with only a small loss of accuracy.
Figure 4.4 shows that given two sets of 1000 power traces with different Hamming
weights and given two sets of 1000 power traces with the same Hamming weight, there
is indeed a difference in power consumption. There are also obvious peaks which are
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good candidates for points of interests.
Figure 4.4: Difference of mean between two different Hamming weight, and two of the
same Hamming weight.
To identify points of interest, we compute average power trace for each category
and the pairwise differences. For every Hamming weight category k, the number of
traces is denoted as Tk and the sample with i. The average power consumption Mk,i
can be expressed as:
Mk,i =
1
Tk
Tk∑
j=1
tj,i
After computing the average trace for each Hamming weight value, we then calculate
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the absolute pairwise differences and sum them up, denoted by Di.
Di =
∑
k1,k2
|Mk1,i −Mk2,i|
After adding all the differences, we get one trace with peaks that vary strongly be-
tween different Hamming weights. From this, we can then select some points among
the highest peaks as the points of interest. However, choosing the n highest points as
the points of interest has proven to be non-optimal [41]. To select good POIs, they
should have the following properties:
• The minimum distance between the points should be at least a clock cycle
or more apart, since additional points in the same clock cycle do not provide
additional information.
• The minimum height of a selected point should be higher than the noise floor of
the sum of differences trace. The noise floor is the sum of all the noise sources
and unwanted signals within a measurement system. In this case the median of
the trace is used as the estimated noise floor.
4.3.3 Create Template
Once the POIs are identified, we then create a template using a multivariate Gaussian
model to map the side-channel information to the Hamming weight of the intermedi-
ate values in the algorithm. The template for a Hamming weight consists of a mean
and covariance matrix. For every trace tj of a Hamming weight category, the corre-
sponding noise vectors are tj −M . They are the basis for the covariance matrix of
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Figure 4.5: Sum of absolute pairwise difference and the noise floor for Hamming weights.
the noise. Covariance is used to measure the linear dependence between two random
variables, X and Y , and can be defined as with i. The covariance of two POIs, X
and Y , can be expressed as:
cov(X, Y ) =
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
(xi − x¯)(yi − y¯)
A matrix of covariances describe the covariances between more than two random
variables. Each entry in the matrix can be defined as C(x, y) = cov(Hx, Hy) where H
represent the set of traces for Hamming weight category x or y. For each Hamming
weight category, the template consists of a set of means, µ, and covariance matrices,
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C, of POIs:
µ =

µ1
µ2
µ3
...
µn

, C =

c1,1 c1,2 c1,3 . . . c1,n
c2,1 c2,2 c2,3 . . . c2,n
c3,1 c3,2 c3,3 . . . c3,n
...
...
...
. . . . . .
cn,1 cn,2 cn,3 . . . cn,n

In the covariance matrix, n is the number of POIs, the diagonal is the variance of the
POIs and the rest are covariance of pairs of POIs. Once we have a template of mean
signal and noise probability distribution for each Hamming weight category, then we
can move on to the attack phase where we try to infer the Hamming weight value
processed by the attacked device.
4.3.4 Template Attack
In this phase, the attacker accesses the actual target to collect a few power traces
from it with an oscilloscope. For each power trace acquired from the target device,
we use the maximum likelihood estimation to find the template that best fits the
captured trace [8]. If the assumption of a Gaussian shaped noise holds, then the
maximum likelihood approach of selecting the template with highest probability of
observing the calculated noise is optimal. Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is
a method of estimating the values for the parameters of a statistical model such that
they maximizes the likelihood that the process described by the model produced the
data observed. Assuming a Gaussian (normal) distribution and given a set of POIs,
we have a set of mean and variance for each POI. MLE find the values of mean and
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variance of the POIs from Hamming weight category that best fits the POIs of the
target trace.
For each template, we compute the noise Ni = Mi − t of the trace where Mi is
the mean trace for that template of a Hamming weight category with t being a trace
from that Hamming weight category. The formula for the n-dimensional multivariate
Gaussian probability distribution, or the probability density function of the leakage
vector, can be expressed as:
P (Ni) =
1√
(2pi)n|C| · e
− 1
2
NTi C
−1Ni
The values at each POI for the target trace are extracted and put into a vector.
We then calculate the probability density function (PDF) for the POIs with respect
to the template of each Hamming weight categories. The Hamming weight with
the highest probability is the candidate. The process is repeated until all Hamming
weights are extracted.
Once the Hamming weights are extracted, they are then added to the algebraic
model of AES to perform ASCA. The Hamming weights and AES algorithms are
written as a set of equations and put through a constraint programming solver to
solve for the secret key. The experiments here focuses on extracting side channel
information. For the algebraic modeling and solving phase, there is no difference
between platforms, whether it’s 8-bit microcontroller or FPGA. The details of how
the algorithm is modeled and how the solver works is explained more in detail in the
prior chapters.
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4.4 Experiments
The side-channel information used are power traces captured from a Xilinx Virtex-5
FPGA during encryption of AES-128. The template attack to create the template
and extract Hamming weights are done using MATLAB. All experiments are done
on a Mac with 3.1GHz Intel Core i5 processor and 8GB of memory.
4.4.1 Hamming Weights
We use 20,000 power traces from FGPA with random input and same key as the
template. The number of traces used for template of each possible Hamming weight
value is shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Power traces in each Hamming weight category.
HW category 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Number of traces 82 608 2216 4324 5513 4418 2132 656 51
In this work we are interested in the accuracy of finding the Hamming weight, since
it’s a crucial component in contributing to the overall practical success of the template
attacks. Aside from various preprocessing techniques and statistical analysis, one
main contribution towards the accuracy of the information extracted are the points
of interests. The ideal number of POIs varies depending on the data. Too few
POIs may not give enough information to get the correct results, and too many may
introduce drastic processing overheads without much gain. The optimal number of
POIs to acquire as many correct Hamming weights as possible is examined in this
section with 100 target traces.
ASCA is able to succeed with only one round of Hamming weights from AES, and
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more rounds drastically increases overhead without much increase in accuracy. Thus
for the data collected, we compared extracting Hamming weights using only power
traces of the first round of AES vs. the whole trace with 10 rounds of AES. Figure
4.6 shows the percentage of correct Hamming weights extracted and the number of
POIs used. The graph shows that for lower number of POIs, using a power trace
from only the first round actually gives better results than using a power trace from
all rounds. This is due to the fact that with more POIs, more noise is introduced as
well since we are only extracting one byte of Hamming weight each time. However,
as the number of POIs used increases, the percentage of correct Hamming weights
extracted becomes comparable whether only one round or all ten rounds of the power
traces are used.
Figure 4.6: Using power trace from first round vs. all rounds.
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However, the accuracy is still very low with only 45% - 50% of Hamming weights
correctly extracted. For a traditional template attack that attacks the secret key, the
data from multiple target traces using the same key are compared to further reduce
error. For example, if the template attack on the power traces produced the set 123,
42, 68 as the likely value for the key byte for the first trace and the set 56, 68, 231 as
the likely value for the same key byte for the second trace, then the correct value for
the key byte is most likely 68. For the attack performed in TASCA, however, multiple
values of the byte may have the same Hamming weights, and the Hamming weight
values between different traces are independent of each other. Thus, the comparison
is invalid and some of the techniques used to improve accuracy of template attacks
are not applicable to ASCA. For this attack, we only examined one trace and treated
each Hamming weight independently.
While the Hamming weights for each trace and byte within the same subround are
independent of each other, the Hamming weights before and after the S-box operations
are correlated to each other. For example, if the input value to the S-box in binary is
0000 0000 and the output is 01100011, then the Hamming weight for the input is 0 and
for the output is 4. If according to the template the values 3, 4 and 5 are equally likely
for the output Hamming weights but the Hamming weight of the input is definitely
0, then the output Hamming weight would be 4. Because there are 256 possible
values, most input Hamming weights would have multiple likely output Hamming
weights. While we cannot completely eliminate the wrong Hamming weights, we are
able to slightly improve the accuracy by examining the Hamming weight pairs (before
and after S-box) for each byte, as shown in Figure 4.7. The original graph refers to
extracting each Hamming weight from the trace independently. The optimized graph
refers to the Hamming weights extracted after eliminating unlikely pairs.
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Figure 4.7: optimized.
Since the percentage of correct Hamming weights acquired increases with the
amount of POIs used, we then explores how much improvement can we get with more
POIs. As mentioned previously, more POIs are not necessarily better. If they are too
close together or too close to the noise floor, then there might be information overlaps
and extra overheads in processing with no improvement in performance. The POIs
are picked with the criteria that they must be above the noise floor and at least 20
sample points apart from each other. The power trace of 10 rounds of AES consists
of 3000 sample points. When using only the section of the power trace for the first
round, it was impossible to pick more than 20 POIs with the criterion set. When
using the whole trace, we are able to pick up to 50 POIs, which is shown in Figure
4.8.
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Figure 4.8: Percentage of correct Hamming weights extracted from the template attack.
While 50% of the Hamming weights can be accurately extracted using 10 or less
POIs, the percentage of Hamming weights that can be extracted accurately drastically
increases with the amount of POIs used up until 35 POIs then slightly decreases when
more than 46 POIs are used. This conforms with the idea proposed by [41] that more
POIs are not necessarily better. They performed a template attack on the key of
the RC4 algorithm implemented on a 8-bit microcontroller and found that there is
a drastic increase in performance until 15 POIs, and then the performance decreases
after 20 POIs. While we are extracting Hamming weights of AES implemented on
FPGA, the trend is similar to that of 8-bit microcontroller, but with the ideal number
of POIs to use being 35 - 46 POIs instead.
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4.5 Results
After determining the ideal amount of POIs to use, we used 45 POIs, which allows us
to extract 81% of the Hamming weights correctly on average, and the other 19% were
within +/-1 range. The experiment was performed on 10 traces. For the two traces
where we are able to get the exact value for all the Hamming weights, we were able
to get the key in 3.2 and 4.6 seconds. For three traces where the amount of erroneous
Hamming weights (+/-1) are less than 20%, we are able to perform the ASCA attack
and get the key in 947.2 seconds on average. However, we are unable to solve for the
key for the remaining traces where the Hamming weights contains more than 20%
error within 3 hours.
For pure template attack guessing the secret key, the attacker can compare the
key guesses from multiple traces and narrow down the set of correct key bytes. In the
case of ASCA, template attack is used to guess the Hamming weights so there are no
comparison between different power traces.
4.6 Conclusions
As shown in this chapter, the noise distribution for FPGA is a normal distribution,
the same as that of 8-bit microcontrollers. While the general trends of success rate
increasing with more points of interests then slightly decrease are the same for FPGA
and 8-bit microcontrollers, data extraction on FPGA do require more POIs than for
8-bit microcontrollers. We were able to demonstrate the applicability of ASCA on an
FPGA device using the same error model. Using template attack with 46 POIs, we
were able to accurately capture 81% of the Hamming weights from the target trace.
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However, this is done without any preprocessing and with one trace only. The success
of the attack depends on the accuracy of the Hamming weights. And the accuracy
of the Hamming weights depends on how data from template is processed and the
statistical analysis used to find the Hamming weights. The same algebraic model and
solver can be used regardless of the devices the data is collected from, and ASCA
is possible as long as a good set of Hamming weights can be extracted via template
attack. The experiments in this chapter demonstrate that FPGA is as susceptible to
ASCA as 8-bit micro-controllers.
This chapter examines the feasibility of ASCA on a cryptographic algorithm im-
plemented in isolation on a dedicated FPGA board. Targeting a normal FPGA on a
prototyping board with various processors, memories and other chips included would
be more challenging. However, the measurement process itself could also be improved
to better isolate the power trace or to take more accurate data. Because the success
of ASCA depends on the accuracy of Hamming weight extracted from the template
attack, it would also be interesting to see how we can improve the template attack
phase used in ASCA. More specifically, how to preprocess the power traces or how
to use statistical analysis to improve accuracy. In terms of preprocessing the power
traces, there are some signal processing methods that can be explored to reduce the
noise. One idea would be to capture the power consumption of the FPGA during
encryption and the power consumption of another section of the same FPGA that
is not performing any calculations at all, then compare to subtract the noise from
the encryption trace. In terms of statistical analysis, pooled variance or different
statistical methods may be used to come up with a more comprehensive template. If
the trace contains too much noise and POIs cannot be selected, Principle Component
Analysis or Fisher’s Linear Discriminant Analysis may be used instead to reduce the
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dimensionality of the leakage vectors [9].
So far the attack has only been done for a single trace, but if the attacker is
able to acquire multiple traces then comparing the data extracted from the multiple
traces may help to reduce the error in Hamming weights extracted. And the extra
information added to TASCA may increase the performance as well.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Conclusion
The experiments demonstrate that ASCA is also applicable to a wide variety of algo-
rithms. Traditionally it has been done on simpler algorithms or the more commonly
used AES with the focus on the S-box statistics. However, it is also possible on more
complex algorithm such as Twofish, which uses more complex key scheduling and
keyed S-boxes. The structure of Twofish not only makes it a more complex algorithm
to model, but also produces less Hamming weights since it performs different opera-
tions on different blocks at the same time. The Hamming weights and the Twofish
algorithm are expressed as a system of CNF equations. The equations are then used
as input for the CrytoMiniSAT solver to solve for the key. While ASCA is unable to
solve for the full 128-bits key in less than 7 days, it is able to solve for at least 96-bits
of the key in less than 2 hours. This means that if the attacker can guess part of the
key or acquire it through another attack, then it is easy to find out the whole key
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using ASCA. If more side channel information or Hamming weights can be used, then
the attack may be able to find all of the key. Due to the complexity of the algorithm,
the model is also very large and boolean equations with SAT solver may not be the
best way to perform the attack.
This led to an examination of the model and the solver. The attack can be further
optimized by using bit-vector representation and a constraint solver, which simplifies
the equation set and allows us to customize the solver for efficiency. The simpler
model also allows us to incorporate error-tolerance into the attack so TASCA is able
to succeed even when the Hamming weight has an offset of 1 or 2 value. The improve-
ment in efficiency allows us to further examine the correlation between the structure
of the algorithm and the attack. The results show that the side-channel information
from some subrounds are indeed more influential than others for a successful attack.
While accurate information from MixColumn is most important for a higher chance
of success for TASCA, the instances with erroneous SubByte run faster than those
with erroneous AddRoundKey.
This information is useful for the attacker when given multiple traces with different
errors, since choosing a trace or a round of Hamming weight with less error in the
MixColumn subround may give a higher chance of successful attack. The fast runtime
of TASCA in our case is strongly dependent on the search algorithm, which filters
out less probable Hamming weights and errors by looking at the correlation of error
between Hamming weights of different subrounds. Thus, when the error range is
expand to +/-2 for Hamming weights, the search algorithm needs to be changed and
the runtime drastically increased.
The most important points that define a successful attack are that it should run
fast, use less data/information with lax requirements, and have a high success rate.
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The difference in runtime and success rate for ASCA is more due to a difference in
implementation rather than being a weakness of the attack itself.
FPGA is as susceptible to ASCA as 8-bit micro-controllers. The success of the
attack depends on the accuracy of the Hamming weights. As long as enough accurate
side-channel information can be extracted from the leakage of the target, ASCA is
possible regardless of the devices or platforms since it is independent of the algebraic
model and solver used.
5.2 Impact
The dissertation has shown that TASCA is effective on a variety of algorithms such
as PRESENT, LED, DES, AES, Twofish. Unlike SCA that uses a divide and conquer
strategy to find each key byte independently, ASCA solves for the whole key at the
same time. This means as long as parts of the key is known, ASCA can recover the
rest of the key. Any and all information from the algorithm can be used in the attack
as long as it is accurate and can be modeled as mathematical equations.
The main disadvantages of the attack are the long runtime, high memory con-
sumption and the ability to tolerate error in the information given. The attack
showed drastic improvement in runtime and memory consumption when switching
from boolean algebra model with SAT solver to bit-vector and linear model with CP
solver. This shows that the disadvantages of the attack are more due to the imple-
mentation rather than being an inherent problem in the attack itself. The speed,
memory consumption and accuracy can be improved by using simpler models and
more efficient solvers.
97
While the attack can succeed regardless of key length or complexity of the algo-
rithm, information from some operations are indeed more influential than others in
terms of success and runtime of the attack. This information may be useful when
designing future algorithms for security. This experiment also provides a basis to
help improve countermeasures for TASCA. Since current countermeasures can be
very time consuming or incurs large overheads that makes it impractical to imple-
ment. Thus, it may be more effective to focus on protecting on specific important
operations instead in order to optimize the trade-off between cost and effectiveness
of the countermeasures.
The attack is also applicable to any device where the internal operations of the
algorithm are known and accurate side-channel information can be acquired. While
this dissertation explored the attack performed on 8-bit microcontroller and FPGA,
the attack may also possible on other more advanced platforms with help of prepro-
cessing and statistical analysis to extract the side channel information from the data.
The attack is done using only one power trace from the target. It is also possible to
use multiple traces or different leakage such as cache or electromagnetic wave as long
as it is possible to extract enough accurate side channel information from them.
5.3 Countermeasures
ASCA has proven to work for a variety of algorithms with only a single trace and can
account for possible error as well. To prevent ASCA, either the algebraic complexity
of the cryptographic algorithm needs to be increased, or countermeasures should be
implemented to make it more difficult to collect accurate SCA.
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Power analysis attacks are difficult to prevent, since even small biases in the power
consumption can lead to exploitable weaknesses. There have been countermeasures
proposed to break the link between the intermediate values or operations of the
cryptographic algorithm and the power consumption of the device that executes the
algorithm. Some countermeasure strategies involve algorithmic modifications such
that the cryptographic operations occur on data that is related to the actual value by
some mathematical relationship that survives the cryptographic operation. One ap-
proach involves blinding parameters to randomize their value. Other countermeasure
strategies to reduce the effectiveness of DPA attacks involve hardware modifications:
varying the chip internal clock frequency has been considered to desynchronize electric
signals, which lead in return to algorithmic enhancements of traditional DPA.
However, while the countermeasures increases the difficulty of the attack, none of
them are completely secure and they often come with large memory or speed overhead.
5.4 Future Work
In addition to what’s presented in this dissertation, there are other areas of interest to
explore. Because the success of ASCA depends on the accuracy of Hamming weight
extracted from the template attack, there are many aspects we can explore to improve
the accuracy of the Hamming weights. In addition to preprocessing and collecting
cleaner data with less noise, it would be interesting to explore different statistical
analysis or methods to correlate different side channel information for more accuracy.
The amount and type of information used can also be explored. For example, try the
attack using different rounds instead of the first round, or see if the results still hold
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true with other profiling methods or leakage models. Aside from Hamming weights,
vectors of probability is proposed as a better way to present side channel information
to minimize loss of data. Fault injection and cache traces have also been used for
the attack. It remains to be seen if using multiple different types of side channel
information will improve the performance of the attack due to the extra information,
or decrease it due to the more complex modeling and extra variables.
TASCA so far has been performed on standard symmetric block ciphers. For
practicality, it would also be interesting to attack AES-256 or other versions of AES
(ECB/CBC etc) that are popular. Since SCA countermeasures are starting to become
common among devices, it would be worth experimenting with the attack on protected
version of the algorithms. One of the most popular countermeasure is masking, and
attacking a masked algorithm would require knowledge of the exact point of Hamming
weights in the power trace that correlates with the intermediate value and the type
of masking.
The performance of the attack may be further improved by finding more efficient
ways to model the possible errors, the main culprit in the long runtime of the current
model used. The attack can also be improved on the solver side as well. For example,
linear programming is polynomial time soluble with continuous variables. It would
also be interesting to see what results the attack would produce with mixed integer
programming, or constraint programming with arbitrary constraints.
Lastly, we can also test error tolerant ASCA for unknown plaintext/ciphertext. No
other ASCA with error tolerance has been successful with unknown plaintext/ciphertext,
and yet, that is one of the big advantage of TASCA over SCA. The different applica-
tions of the attack done in this dissertation looks at each target trace independently.
However, if the attacker is able to acquire multiple traces from the target, then the ex-
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tra information from incorporating multiple traces can drastically improve the attack
as well.
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